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## **Scenario Design of Danish and Norwegian Military Engagement in Africa**

**Abstract:** The aim of the article is to develop and propose effective scenario-building methods regarding the scale and nature of Danish and Norwegian military involvement in selected regions of Africa (Western Africa, Sahel, Horn of Africa) over the next 3–4 years. The adopted time frames result from the planning cycles of defence and security strategy of the analysed Nordic states. The subject of analyses will be the security support provided by Denmark and Norway for selected African countries (Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria) through two forms of using the armed forces. Participation of Danish and Norwegian military contingents in crisis management and peace support activities – as first. Secondly, direct military assistance addressed to selected countries in order to establish national and regional security systems and rebuild defence capabilities will be reviewed. This study will aim to develop an optimal forecasting methodology of future Danish and Norwegian influence on chosen African countries through the use of military instruments over a specified time horizon. The construction of optimal methods for scenario design requires knowledge about the doctrine of international involvement of the armed forces, action strategies, procedures for the selection of forces, and military assets designated to achieve the assumed goals. The appropriate scenarios methodology shall include aspects of both states' future foreign military policy in selected regions of Africa. The following are the scale of involvement, the instruments of influence, strategic and tactical goals, the military means, institutional levels of cooperation, direct benefits from protecting both Nordic states' vital interests in a given region.

**Keywords:** Denmark, Norway, forecasting, foreign military assistance, scenario, military engagement.

## **Projektowanie scenariusza duńskiego oraz norweskiego wojskowego zaangażowania w Afryce**

**Abstrakt:** Celem artykułu jest opracowanie efektywnych narzędzi i odpowiedniej metodologii budowy scenariusza dotyczących skali oraz charakteru zaangażowania Danii i Norwegii w wybranych regionach Afryki (Afryka Zachodnia, Sahel, róg Afryki) w perspektywie 3–4 lat.

Chodzi przy tym o zaangażowanie z wykorzystaniem instrumentów militarnych oraz w formie interwencji wojskowych. Autor dąży do zidentyfikowania możliwych metod prognozowania skali oraz charakteru pomocy Danii i Norwegii w zakresie bezpieczeństwa dla wybranych państw, takich jak Kamerun, Ghana, Kenia, Mali, Nigeria. Analizie poddane zostały zarówno możliwości udziału duńskich czy norweskich kontyngentów ekspedycyjnych w działaniach o charakterze zarządzania kryzysowego oraz wsparcia pokoju, jak i czynniki determinujące bezpośrednią pomoc wojskową dla tych afrykańskich państw w formie współpracy dwustronnej w celu wzmocnienia ich bezpieczeństwa. W tekście przedstawiono czynniki determinujące politykę wojskową Danii i Norwegii wobec wybranych państw Afryki, które powinny zostać uwzględnione w procesie prognostycznym. Artykuł stanowi swoistą propozycję dotyczącą metodologii prognozowania średnio-terminowej aktywności wojskowej dwóch państw nordyckich w Afryce.

**Słowa kluczowe:** Dania, Norwegia, prognozowanie, zagraniczna pomoc wojskowa, scenariusz, zaangażowanie wojskowe.

## Introduction

At the turn of the third decade of the 21st century, Danish Defence Forces (in Danish: *Forsvaret*) and Norwegian Defence Forces (in Norwegian: *Forsvaret*) are actively involved in a broad network of military cooperation with a large group of African countries. Analysing this involvement, it should be noted that the military potential of the Danish state and the military potential of the Norwegian state are both quite limited. In particular, if the number of military personnel in active service, the types and numbers of military equipment, units, or weapon systems of different types are taken into account. Despite this fact, Danish and Norwegian armed forces participation in various cooperation undertakings and support programs (addressed primarily to East African countries as well as West Africa, Sahel region, and the Gulf of Guinea) can be assessed as significant, sometimes even impressive. For this reason, these countries were selected as the subject of analysis.

Between 2018 and 2020, the Danish and Norwegian expeditionary units have participated in various forms and scales in joint military ventures and cooperation programmes, among others, with the armed forces of Kenya, Mali, Cameroon, the armies of the group of countries under the Eastern Africa Standby Force - EASF, within MINUSMA - the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali, and the armed forces of the group G5 Sahel. For over a decade, the Danish Ministry of Defence (in Danish: *Forsvarsministeriet*) and the Norwegian Ministry of Defence (in Norwegian: *Forsvarsdepartement*), through their subordinate structures and forces, have been planning consistently

and - what is most important – successfully implementing, the strategic plan of the military involvement on the African continent. The symbol of Danish military support for African security was the Danish navy's missions of the *Absalon* – the class ships within the joint, multinational fleet several times in 2008–2015. It was a part of anti-piracy operations such as Ocean Shield and the international maritime teams Combined Maritime Forces CTF 151.

State fragility and political destabilisation in Africa affect multiple Danish and Norwegian interests. Of the greatest current concern of the two states' decision-makers is the potential for transnational networks of violent extremist organisations, particularly those affiliated with al-Qaeda and other Salafist terrorist groups, to flourish in these environments (Norwegian Intelligence Service, 2020). Danish and Norwegian governments are also concerned about piracy, illegal trafficking (esp. narcotics, weapons and people), and numerous military security issues (Norwegian Intelligence Service, 2021). Both states' priorities - considered the most important in Africa - are counterterrorism, counterpiracy, countering activity the radical Islamic movements and armed groups, enforcing partner nations military strength and capabilities (Danish Defence Intelligence Service, 2020, pp. 49–71).

The aim of this article is to understand the roots of two Nordic states' engagement in Africa and then formulate a methodology for forecasting future scenarios regarding the scale and nature of Denmark's and Norway's involvement in selected regions of Africa (Western Africa, Horn of Africa, Sahel), which is based on military instruments and will take the form of military involvement, over the next 3–4 years. The author intends to answer the question of what factors and determinants should be taken into account in order to develop correct forecasts and scenarios for Nordic military engagement in Africa. Moreover, the author aims to identify methods of integrating the mentioned factors and determinants into a coherent prognostic tool. In the author's opinion, it is fully legitimate to discuss and present these countries at the same time. This is because their doctrines of foreign military engagement share many similarities.

The subject of analyses will be the security support provided by these states for selected West African, the Horn of Africa, and Sahel countries (Cameroon, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Kenya) through two forms of international use of the armed forces. First, the participation of two Nordic states' military contingents in crisis management and peace support activities is discussed. Secondly, direct

military assistance is addressed to selected countries in order to establish national and regional security systems and capabilities. It is worth emphasizing that in theoretical terms, Nordic military involvement in Africa should be studied both using the paradigms of realistic and neorealist theories, as well as using the paradigms of the liberal theories of international security and international relations. The military assistance of Denmark and Norway towards African states is determined by premises attributed to a realistic and neorealist perception of global politics, as well as by premises resulting from liberal thinking (Nowak & Nowak, 2015, pp. 26–33).

### **International military engagement as a subject of analysis**

Danish and Norwegian defence policy has a much broader function than country protecting and war fighting alone (Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 2009, pp. 53–72). Through the international defence engagement, both states use military capabilities to influence and shape the international security environment, but also to promote and protect the Danish and Norwegian interests abroad. Thus, foreign military engagement can be considered as a forward presence overseas. It is a special sphere of defence activity in which armed forces use the military capability to achieve influence and, as a result, to create the effect strong enough on the support of outcomes set out by the government. In other words, the overall aim of foreign military engagement is to support national-enduring interests in a given country or region by delivering hard power.

Danish and Norwegian international defence engagement understood as the activity having a military-strategic end-state has six key characteristics. It is based on a long-term view of important goals in a region or country and clearly assumes a desirable end-state. Armed forces activity is deliberate and not conducted solely in response to the security events, but instead takes a view of long-term interests set against the current situation and potential future development. The military activity involves foreign partners, who can choose which activities they participate in. Foreign military relations require a cooperative approach based on mutual interests. Armed forces activity may be directed towards conflict prevention, security sector reform, and military capability building in priority countries. The overseas military activity supports three pillars of Danish and Norwegian global stability strategy: early warning, rapid crisis prevention and response, and upstream conflict prevention (Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 2020).

The forecast methodology developing in order to prepare and formulate the future scenario of Danish and Norwegian engagement in the African security system shall relate simultaneously to the two forms of international military involvement. First of all, forecasts of possible forms of the use of military force as part of contingents the international, multinational stabilisation forces. It means Danish Armed Forces and Norwegian Armed Forces participation in peace support or peace enforcement operation in weak, failed states and participation in crisis management operation during different kinds of internal conflicts or local - regional conflicts. Secondly, forecasts of possible forms of involvement of both states' military forces and resources (bilateral and multilateral actions at the military level) as part of foreign military assistance aimed to strengthen the defence potential, defence capabilities, and crisis response mechanisms of African partner countries.

In the process of building a forecasting methodology, research attention should be focused on the Kingdom of Denmark (in Danish: *Kongeriget Danmark*) and the Kingdom of Norway (in Norwegian: *Kongeriket Norge*) as two political actors undertaking specific international activities. In that case, the subject of the forecasting process will be the Danish and Norwegian influence on chosen African countries (shaping their security and defence policies) through the use of military instruments over a specified time horizon. The forecasting method should cover all components of the policy formulation and implementation process. The construction of the scenario requires knowledge about the doctrine of international involvement of the armed forces, action strategies, procedures for the selection of forces, and military assets designated to achieve the assumed goals.

For the purpose of this article, we should distinguish between main terms and categories and tend to explain them. Both, *security cooperation* term and *security involvement* term can be generally connected with the broad category of activities undertaken by Danish and Norwegian ministries of defence, to encourage and enable foreign partners to work with both Nordic states with the aim to achieve national strategic security objectives. They can include the interactions of pure military nature and foreign defence relations. *Foreign military assistance* (also known as synonyms: *foreign defence assistance*, *foreign security assistance*, *foreign military support*) refers to governmental activities that support the development of capability and capacity of foreign security forces (including armed forces) and main supporting institutions. Foreign military assistance activities are primarily used to

assist a host nation - partner nation in defending against internal and transnational threats to stability. Military assistance to partner countries can take the form of defence materials transfer, military training, military education, defence-related services to the host nation's branches and units (Larsen & Nissen, 2017).

In the problematic dimension, the correct forecasting method will concern the key aspects of Denmark's and Norway's future foreign military policy in selected regions of Africa. The following are the scale of involvement, the instruments of influence, strategic and tactical goals, the military means involved, institutional levels of cooperation, direct benefits in terms of protecting two Nordic states' vital interests in a given region. State leaders and decision-makers tend to balance multiple militaries, political, economic, and other considerations in managing defence-related affairs. In a crisis or conflict, they make some decisions based primarily on the broader non-military strategic considerations. While in the face of tactical or operational situations, military concerns and motivations may be more imperative. Among the most important forms of defence-related political-strategic decisions are those to commit the nation to multidimensional, lasting, deep foreign military cooperation or various levels of military support to partners overseas. But also, are those to deescalate a regional or international crisis in a way consistent with a national security strategy. Mentioned political-strategic decisions might take various practical forms of activity in peace time: international employment of military forces at the operational or tactical level, training and equipping programmes intended for foreign units, participation in the execution of different types of host-nation operations, non-combat activities in cooperation with formations of partner countries (Reveron, 2016).

The development of a forecasting method in order to present possible scenarios for the scale and nature of possible Danish and Norwegian military involvement in selected African countries such as Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, and Nigeria is an extremely important and desirable research task today. Moreover, in the author's opinion, there is a serious gap in the literature (both Danish, Norwegian, and international) when it comes to forecasting possible scenarios for two states' medium-term security support to certain African countries. No scientific publications are forecasting the Nordic military involvement in this continent. The proposed prognostic method of developing functional scenarios will help to fill the existing gap.

In the author's opinion, the most appropriate methodological approach in constructing forecasts for this particular research case is the analytical approach. It enables the identification of the most important variables and the analysis of the correlation between them. Moreover, in this case, the best forecasting methods seem to be extrapolation and the analogy method. Extrapolation is of particular importance for the adequacy of forecasts, i.e., the transfer of previously observed tendencies or trends into the future (Sulek, 2010, pp. 27–31). A special matrix must be created in order to formulate scenario proposals, taking into account all elements necessary for their correct formulation and presentation. The matrix elements should be conditions, determinants, objectives, types of activities, and forms of use of the military instruments under cooperative programs, planning requirements, and conducting defence activity in a particular case. The implementation by the Danish and Norwegian armed forces their strategic functions in the form of direct military assistance in the relations with given African countries is and will be (in each specific future case) a peculiar synthesis or composition of various strategies, types of activities, and platforms of cooperation and influence. As a result, in order to correct formulate scenarios, it is necessary to include them comprehensively (Thurston, 2020).

At the root of the international military, foreign commitment, and engagement of modern states is usually the will to implement the three fundamental goals of strategic importance for its national and international security interests. First, it is about protection and defence against external threats and rapidly spreading challenges for national security, coming from the international environment - global security system (i.e., protection of vital security interests of the state and citizens). Secondly, every government focuses on protection and defence of prosperity against negative dynamics and processes within the international security system, disrupting the proper functioning of their own economy and destabilising the proper functioning of selected areas of international trade and global economy (such as free access to natural resources, the possibility of using external - foreign energy resources, uninterrupted movement of goods and global trade). Finally, the crucial goal is the protection and defence of global influences, understood as the ability to effectively influence and shape specific processes taking place within other countries or regions in the world. In the scope of among others processes of democratisation, building well-functioning multilateral, local, and regional institutions and security management systems, processes of

developing permanent and stable state institutions, protecting human rights and freedoms, preventing the spread of influence of armed movements and groups of terrorist and fundamentalist nature (Ministry of Defence of Denmark, 2009, pp. 16–19).

Assuming that these are the strategic goals of the military involvement of modern states and the objectives of military support policy, considerations regarding the Danish and Norwegian future military presence in Africa must start with the answer to the question: Which of these goals can Danish and Norwegian states implement and achieve through military influence on African countries? What must be underlined is that both Danish and Norwegian concepts of foreign military assistance stress certain key aspects of a military involvement that expanded well beyond tactical capabilities development and technical transformation of partner countries' armed forces. The official doctrinal guidelines of both states define the strategic goal of foreign military assistance as creating foreign military forces that are competent, capable, sustainable, committed, and confident and have a structure and apparatus tied to regional stability. As we see, the ultimate, overriding goal of foreign military assistance is to develop security (armed) forces that contribute to the legitimate governance of the partner country population (Gustavsen, Lien & Tollefsen, 2017).

### **Nordic dimensions of international military activity**

International studies theory has identified two primary but interrelated drivers of international military activity and international military cooperation of modern states – structural causes (underlying) and proximate causes (immediate). Structural roots of international military engagement and efforts can be understood as the broader, systematic, political, economic, doctrinal, or societal level forces that increase the impulse and urge for states to use their own military force to achieve their strategic goals in the international system. These drivers could be found at the global-systemic or regional-systemic level of investigation. As for proximate drivers, these could be the details - specific parameters involved in the immediate flashpoint of a crisis situation or detailed issues related to a specific decision-making process under certain conditions. Proximate forces directly affect decisions regarding forms and methods of international military power and armed forces employment and directly determine the nature of foreign military involvement (Gray, 2018).

In the case of research on the future Danish and Norwegian military involvement in Africa and on the future scope and nature of these states military cooperation with the group African countries such as Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, and Nigeria, it should also be formulated as the basis for creating individual scenarios. The structure of such scenarios should contain a complete, comprehensive map of possible, forecasted security conditions within two Nordic states' military involvement. Initially, the following security situations conditioning Nordic military involvement in Africa may be identified as follows:

- Socio-political or military crisis in a given country;
- Activities of armed groups or terrorist groups destabilising the internal situation and transferring armed conflict to neighbouring countries;
- International armed intervention in the form of peace support/enforcement operations or crisis management operations;
- The need to strengthen the internal security system and the defence capabilities of the partner country. In order to enforce its abilities to eliminate irregular armed groups or criminal groups (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018).

A prerequisite for building possible scenario of Danish and Norwegian military involvement in the countries of the West African region, the Horn of Africa region, and the Sahel is to accept the thesis that the security of both countries (especially in its international dimension) is very much linked to the development of the political, economic and security situation in almost all regions of the African continent. What's more, it is strongly connected with defence policy of given African states (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017, pp. 16–18). Consequently, the effects of various phenomena, processes, and events taking place in the individual African countries, directly and indirectly, affect the level of security of two Nordic states. But also, they determine the possibilities of implementing international interests by the Danish and Norwegian governments (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2010).

Therefore, the initial hypothesis of this article can be adopted that in the coming decades, the political situation and security status of African countries (recognised as being of key importance for Denmark's and Norway's role and position in the global economic, political, and international security system) will be the point of the departure in the process of formulating both countries defence policies and international influence strategies (The Danish Government, 2018). According to

most international forecasts, today, at the turn of the second and third decade of the 21st century, nearly 50 countries on the African continent are characterised by the weakness and inefficiency of political power so serious that it threatens their sovereignty, survival, existence as an independent, coherent political and legal entity. At the same time, hostile non-state actors (fundamentalist political-religious movements or terrorist organisations) in favourable circumstances could probably attempt to break up these state structures (Hull Wiklund & Nilsson, 2016). The collapse of weak states, which are today threatened by destabilisation, may occur both as a result of the influence of internal factors and actors, as well as the influence of external actors. It can, therefore, be assumed without a doubt that security in selected regions of Africa is already the key place in the catalogue of the long-lasting, strategic objectives of Danish and Norwegian foreign policies and also the key tasks within military security policy priorities of both Nordic states (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2013).

Danish and Norwegian activities towards African countries and military involvement in selected African states primarily take two forms. First, we observe activities aimed at eliminating or neutralising foreign threats to the state, society, internal values, but also the position and role of two Nordic countries in international relations and within the global political and security system. Secondly, we are also witnessing preventive and pre-emptive actions which are primarily aimed at contributing to the increase of security strength and capabilities (organisation of defence structures, development of crisis response systems) of recipient countries of Danish and Norwegian assistance and military support (Lunde Saxi, 2010, pp. 91–118).

According to Danish and Norwegian armed forces doctrine, operations abroad are categorised in relation to the conflict spectrum and designated as *military contribution in peacetime*, *stabilisation operations*, *combat against irregular forces*, and *combat against regular forces*. Such a categorisation is an aid to describing which operational methods, force structure, and what kind of military activity is necessary under differing operational environments, geopolitical surroundings, and warfare conditions. One of the crucial factors affecting the impact, nature, and strategic aims of foreign military assistance is whether support is provided in the context of the United Nations peace support efforts or provided through bilateral or regional - multilateral cooperation's channels and tools. The Nordic armed forces operations abroad will often form part of a multinational peace

support operation mandated under Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (Balcerowicz, 2006, pp. 152–166). United Nations and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation - NATO member states can operate within the following categorisation of peace support operations: preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, peace-making, peace enforcement (Defence Staff, 2007, pp. 23–29).

Most of the conflicts of the last twenty years in Africa can be called: *low-intensity conflicts*. They are often long-lasting and can cover different forms of pressure and armed violence, from terrorism to rebel movements and irregular formation activity. Low-intensity conflicts are generally limited to a specific geographical area (mostly are internal, intra-state) and can be characterised by limitations on weapons, tactics, and the level of violence. Irregular forces engaged in low-intensity conflicts can cover a broad spectrum of opponents, ranging from well-organised rebel movements, local warlords, and their followers to criminal groups (Gray, 2005, pp. 212–254). Irregular forces are often ideologically or religiously motivated and largely unaffected by the type of rationality underlining the traditional, classic way of fighting - classical Western warfare art (Hammes, 2006, pp. 130–152). According to the defence doctrines of both Nordic countries, armed forces shall, within the limits of international law, be able to contribute military assets and capabilities as a part of multinational efforts or bilateral relations and commitments. They aim to impose control over the situation that threatens Western-Nordic security or Danish and Norwegian vital interests or has other unacceptable consequences for international law and international security. Such crisis management might include all kinds of military-related challenges and undertakings. In principle, it takes place anywhere globally and be led by international organizations such as the United Nations and NATO or be carried out by coalitions of limited duration. In the aftermath of some acute international or regional security crises, there will be a need to employ military assets and capabilities for some time to maintain control and contribute to stability and positive development (Kusztal & Rdzanek, 2020).

Two forms of foreign military engagement - involvement providing military support to diplomacy and assisting other countries in their defence system (armed forces) development are considered to be critical points of Danish and Norwegian defence doctrine. As part of the effort to establish international peace and security, armed forces shall contribute to helping selected partners (also in Africa) build

up their self-defence capability, capabilities to contribute to regional security and reform or modernise their defence system, esp., armed forces. A special, unique kind of their military involvement in Africa is military assistance to selected countries. Foreign military assistance and foreign military cooperation (force enabling) consist of improving the capacity and capability of international partners to apply or threaten force and encompasses a wide array of concepts. It may be used to help state or non-state actors bolster their military capability, to improve state or regional security, to enhance elements or institutions of military power, to make an allied or aligned state a more effective partner, or to link a foreign state to one's own security strategy by way of military cooperation (Omeni, 2018). Foreign military contribution of Danish and Norwegian armed forces might include education and training of other states' military and paramilitary personnel. It also can take the form of knowledge and operational skills transfer to partner forces to a more effective fight against terrorism and international organised crime. The framework of foreign activity planning is always done in the context of what the partner state wishes to do and the regional geopolitical and balance of power context (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2018).

We can take for granted that foreign military assistance is a term that refers to all material, operational, and functional efforts to influence, engage and support partner-state security institutions, including all defence system components and armed forces structures - services. Foreign military assistance encompasses all related terms, such as *Building partner-state capacity* (BPC), *Security sector reform* (SSR), *Defence institution building* (DIB). Most directly explaining, Danish and Norwegian military building and capacity building assistance, including knowledge transfer and training organisation, strengthens overseas security and defence forces (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2015). Two Nordic states also provide professional military education, as well as training, in order to build partner capacity in logistics, intelligence, operational planning, and other higher-level defence functions. Ideally, partner forces use this increased capacity to provide public internal and external security better, to deter a hostile insurgency and illegal militia groups, and to prevent terrorism, while adhering to the norms of human rights and civilian control of the military sector (Sedra, 2017, pp. 52–156). If partner security and defence formations and units are unable to deter challenges from insurgents or militia groups, improved arms and training could enable these forces to carry out more effective counterterrorism and

counterinsurgency operations. For example, Kenyan land and naval forces that received international training and equipment proved the capability of conducting a complex amphibious assault against al-Shabaab in Somalia. Internationally supported forces from Uganda, Kenya, and Burundi (operating as a part of the African Union Mission in Somalia) were able to retake most areas that had been captured and, after that, controlled by al-Shabaab (Kusztal & Rdzanek, 2020, pp. 237–267).

As it was mentioned, to achieve its strategic security goals in Africa, above all: combating terrorism, combating maritime piracy, counteracting belligerent rebel and insurgency movements, Denmark and Norway prefer cooperation and connection with African partner nations. Rather than deploying a large number of forces, the Danish government (Norwegian - to some extent, not entirely) has invested in building defence and security capabilities of its African partners. According to Danish officials and decision-makers view, such investments and commitments have made both Africa and Nordic states more secure. From the perspective of the Danish foreign military assistance concept, relatively small but wise investments and transfers made within partner countries' defence institutions offer disproportionate benefits to Europe and Scandinavia in the future, reducing the risks of destabilisation and radicalisation of persistent conflicts.

Analysing the premises of two Nordic countries' participation in bilateral and multilateral cooperation with African countries on a military level, one can put forward the working hypothesis that it contributes to implementing three strategic goals related to the national interest and security. First, it always results from the desire to protect vital interests like political or economic in the security sphere in the face of a real threat of threat to their undisturbed implementation. In this case, we can talk about preventive measures. Providing specific military support or engaging in rebuilding the military capabilities of a partner country is intended to give the possibility to prevent certain types of threats. Secondly, building a network of institutional, functional, operational, and political cooperation with the defence systems and security actors of African countries could create a set of certain possibilities. It allows countries like Denmark or Norway to use their armed forces in overseas operations - foreign armed interventions optimally and most efficiently if there is a need to dislocate forces and undertake different military operations in the selected corner of the African continent. Thirdly, we should not forget that any form of military cooperation, any form of military involvement

that helps to build and develop the armed forces of a partner country, always contributes to shaping the regional security system. Hence, it indirectly gives the opportunity to influence decisions taken by political and military decision-makers of the recipient country in relation to the military security and defence policy established and implemented by this entity (Kusztal & Rdzanek, 2020).

A forecasting methodology should set out the key strategic aims of international military engagement (Williams & Bellamy, 2021, pp. 113–244). These strategic aims are:

- To establish comprehensive military and security relationships in the regional and global dimension through the persistent presence supporting bilateral and multilateral standing commitments.
- To build international and partner-actors' capabilities and will to counter and fight existing threats as well as the will to contribute to peace support operations.
- To prevent armed conflicts and tackle the root causes of regional instability.
- To sustain and empower the political position and influence with allies and partners.
- To protect and promote a stable, rules-based international system that directly and indirectly supports national security interests (Kusztal & Rdzanek, 2020).

So, as we can see from the above characteristics, a fairly long list of generic - fundamental foreign defence engagement goals can be enumerated. One should count among them the following: defend, protect, influence, promote, build, enforce, encourage, deter (Makowski, 2000, pp. 224–268).

### **Foundations and variables of the forecasting method**

In the process of constructing the forecasting method and selecting the most appropriate methodology for determining the future military activity of the two Nordic states in Africa, one should take into account the multiplicity of methods and strategies of the state's military influence on the outside world. State's concept and approach for applying instruments of power (including military ones), launched to achieve the desired security goals - to reach assumed international security influence - may include various forms of foreign military activity. An effective prognostic model must make it possible to formulate specific engagement scenarios adequately to the security situation in beneficiary countries

and the dynamics of the security situation in a given region of Africa. The range of possible forms of military use of force is very wide and includes, among others, observation, enabling, shaping, persuading, inducing, deterring, subduing (Watts et al., 2018, pp. 9–46).

Therefore, while developing a Danish and Norwegian military involvement forecast methodology in Africa and building scenarios for further Danish and Norwegian engagement, it is necessary to comprehensively determine which specific consequences and effects result from the two states' actions. When a threat or armed violence occurs, assistance and commitment of the expeditionary contingents are primarily focused on measures to prevent instability or armed destabilisation. Emphasis is therefore placed on strengthening the resilience and effectiveness of the partner's defence system and providing protection for the critical components of this system. We can predict that in the foreseeable future, both Nordic countries will be using foreign military assistance mostly to develop partner capacity to combat irregular threats such as terrorism, maritime piracy, insurgency. But also to gain access to and influence with important partner nations located in regions of crucial importance to its interests. However, when the scale and activity of hostilities and the intensity of organised violence led to a classic political-military crisis or even a classic internal conflict, then a change in the form of military support is required (Shurkin, Pezard & Zimmerman, 2017, pp. 59–86).

When it comes to the methodological approach to developing an optimal way of forecasting the Danish and Norwegian military involvement in the security of selected African countries, we should take into account key factors determining their activity in relations with African partners. It must be remembered that the strategic process of military involvement in a foreign country always begins with an evaluation of the international and domestic contexts of that kind of activity, and what is also very important - the possibility of effective action in the given conditions (Holmquist, 2014). The international context describes the elements and conditions in the international context, powerfully shape both the situation at hand and possible approaches to dealing with it. The adopted prognostic method must identify the most important regional and global conditions and dynamics that bear on the nature of the situation at hand. The state's own domestic context can either enhance or inhibit the ability to develop a strategy for a particular challenge. Thus, the prognostic method must identify domestic political,

economic, bureaucratic, social-cultural, and technological factors that are likely to help or hinder both the strategy-making effort and its viability once executed. Constraints are the factors that limit strategic freedom of action. Whether in the form of diminished elements of power or weak institutions and actors, insufficient means are often difficult to overcome. The element of time potentially poses a constraint on action. Also, policy, legal and normative boundaries can present constraints, whether imposed from within the state or externally.

Political-strategic decision-making considering foreign military cooperation and foreign military assistance responds to both pure military and non-military considerations. The forecasting of such decisions must adequately represent both military and non-military factors. Scenarios that realistically simulate conditions that would shape strategic decision-making regarding foreign military engagement and assistance must absolutely be based on broad expertise on relevant countries involved and accurate representation of the key structural factors. A well-developed technique for scenario construction should cover any type of foreign military engagement that includes the use of military forces overseas. This can range from peace-time non-combatant assistance, through participation in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, to deployment of force contingent within the framework of major peace support operation or comprehensive crisis response mission. A well-designed forecasting model should apply only to those hypothetical sequences of events, which are logical, sensible, feasible, and plausible. But, what must be underline, must apply to the security dynamic, which can lead to military involvement or intervention. The very act of envisioning a hypothetical situation of intervention or assistance in the face of a security crisis or regional armed conflict requires the imaginative visualisation of the world that may radically differ from the current state of affairs (Van der Lijn et al., 2019).

Each scenario of the future military involvement of both Nordic states in selected African countries should absolutely be based on all factors (internationally, regionally, or domestically) that affect - determine the development or implementation of Nordic foreign military engagement. That kind of context can include political matters, historical events, cultural, religious, ethnic, or tribal factors, societal norms, and structures. Almost anything could influence the armed forces' activity in a specific country or region, and implementation of the national security aims those countries that have engaged in various programs of military activity in the international dimension.

When we develop predictive methods for the future involvement of Denmark and Norway in the security system and security dynamics of selected African countries, it must be absolutely remembered that the intervention will always be associated with destabilization or conflict in that country or its security environment. That is, in order to effectively forecast the nature of the military engagement of Denmark and Norway in Africa, tools for forecasting armed conflicts in selected regions of Africa should be built (Peters, 2007). When the analysis is made of the security situation in the states of the African continent, which are potential participants of military cooperation and security support, it should be noted that they are a source of potential armed conflicts. The countries like Mali or Nigeria face significant challenges that are a direct result of the historical and continuing cycles of violence (Forsvarsakademiet, 2014). They include, among others, high poverty rates due to poor economic performance, poor governance, endless conflicts between different groups, weak institutions, ethnic affinities, and general internal insecurity (Cold-Ravnkilde, 2013, pp. 13–37).

The development of a method for building scenario that incorporates international studies and wars study's findings of international conflict, civil war, and security crisis requires some expertise of the different types of factors that can lead or contribute to armed conflict within the boundaries of the partner state, or region where the partner states are located. The generic escalation templates offer a starting point for structuring the key assumptions of the specific scenarios (Lia, 2005). The template should include all variants that explore how relevant risk of destabilisation, armed crisis, or conflict can favour Danish and Norwegian involvement. The point of departure of initial forecasting assumptions and approaches must be making identification of generic crisis and conflict scenarios, which seek to capture the range of situations in which Danish and Norwegian military forces may be deployed in partner countries on the African continent (McCauley, 2017, pp. 96–170). That kind of generic scenario will help to identify the particular nature of threat or challenge facing Danish and Norwegian security interests and indicate the military responses that are most likely to work. These scenarios shall be limited to specific moments in time, location, characteristic of situations, particular types of actors, different phases of crisis or destabilisation.

The logic needed to develop and introduce Danish and Norwegian military strategy forecasting methods towards some countries in Africa entails applying the six following fundamental elements. These six essential elements must be the

part of strategic thinking matrix before taking the developing credible scenario methodology:

- Analysing the strategic situation (the context and assumptions about that context);
- Identifying Danish and Norwegian interests at stake in the situation;
- Defining the desired Nordic states ends and goals (the outcomes sought), to include first defining the overarching political aim (long-lasting), and then the subordinate objectives required to achieve it;
- Identifying the resources and capabilities needed to achieve the desired ends;
- Designing - project the ways and means that both state governments have to use to achieve the desired ends;
- Assessing - to evaluate the challenges, costs, and risks associated - connected with the strategic design.

### **Conclusions**

As has already been said, the main research objective of that article is to develop a proprietary methodology for forecasting and analysing the Danish and Norwegian involvement in the chosen region in Africa. But, what's important, to carry out such an evaluation of the Danish and Norwegian engagement while respecting the principle of taking into account a wide range of parameters, determinants, and indicators. As a result of adopting such an approach concept, the existing cognitive and practical gap will be filled. The logical framework that will be built by us should make possible to link various forms and types of activities or cooperation to strategic aims through outputs and narrow objectives. To help us consider what activities could achieve specific objectives and strategic aims, and in order to support the logical framework, we have to undertake a mapping defence engagement objective onto a range of generic output types, which have been developed for forecasting purposes. Activity-to-object mapping and objective types - output types are crucial pillars of international taxonomy. That development is a prerequisite to give structure to the wide range of available military undertakings, interventions, or cooperation and then to apply necessary evaluation measures. The implications of this research approach extend well beyond qualitative analyses in specific contexts. It allows us to explore the effects of foreign military assistance programmes in the selected regions generally

characterised by lower levels of institutional development and higher political fragility than the global average.

An effective method for forecasting the possibilities of military involvement in developing security systems of selected partner countries in Africa should make possible to look beyond individual cases. As well as to detect, assess, and predict broad trends in the relationships between Danish and Norwegian military assistance provided and main threats, unfavourable security phenomena, military armed violence, and clashes in Africa. More specifically, it should support to seek answers a set of the following questions:

- What is the nature of the relationship between Danish and Norwegian military involvement (as a part of peace support forces contingent or in the form of foreign military assistance provided) and the incidence of maritime piracy, terrorism, insurgency, rebel activity, and civil wars?
- Can Denmark's and Norway's foreign military assistance be an effective tool for achieving counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and counterpiracy goals in Africa?
- Are there trade-offs between Danish and Norwegian efforts to disrupt, degrade and ultimately defeat various belligerent and crime groups in Africa and the goal of developing partner security and defence forces assets and operational capabilities?
- Are certain types and procedures of Nordic-provided military assistance more successful and efficient than others?
- Are certain types of African partner nations more promising cooperation partners than others?

The Danish and Norwegian engagement scenarios that will be used in the forecast method should be developed based on the successive steps. The first step is getting to know and presenting the Danish and Norwegian perception of the security situation in selected West African countries, the Horn of Africa region, and the Sahel region. The second step is to carry out the analysis and characteristics of both states' interests (political, economic, ideological) in relation to selected countries and within the relations with selected African countries. The third step is to carry out the analysis and characterisation of strategic goals and doctrines of Danish and Norwegian foreign and security policy in the coming decades in relation to the African continent. The fourth step is to carry out the analysis and characterisation of connections and relationships between specific conditions

and dynamics in selected regions of Africa, and vital goals, interests, values of Danish and Norwegian foreign, economic and security policy on a continental and global dimension. The fifth step is to carry out the analysis and characteristics of connections and dependencies between the state of internal and regional security in selected areas of Africa and the Danish and Norwegian position and role in international relations. The sixth step is to prepare forecasts of the possible dynamics of the security situation in selected countries and regions of Africa. The seventh step is to carry out the analysis and characteristics of military influence available to both Nordic states in relations with African countries. The eighth step is to define and describe the needs of potential African partners in the organisation and functioning of state security systems.

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