

<https://doi.org/10.34862/rbm.2022.2.2>

Robert Bobkier
Abraham & Ben Hadar Law and Audit
robert.bobkier@gmail.com
<https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8212-6309>

Piotr Herman
Abraham & Ben Hadar Law and Audit
piotrherman@o2.pl
<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4245-6167>

On the Ambiguity of the Concept of ‘Narcoterrorism’

Abstract: The article presents issues associated with the term ‘narcoterrorism.’ It started to be used at the end of the Cold War. Initially, it was used in relation to the cooperation of drug traffickers with leftist terrorist organizations in Latin America and the states of the Soviet bloc. It should be noted that there is no single, generally accepted definition of this term in the literature. Because it can mean both using methods attributed to terrorists by drug cartels and financing their activities by terrorist groups through drug trafficking. Regarding the first meaning, this study presents the case of Colombia and Mexico, countries particularly affected by drug cartels. About the second meaning, the subject of the description is the case of Afghanistan, in which the rule of the Taliban terrorist group is financed by the opium trade. Narcoterrorism understood in this way was then “relocated” to the Balkans, where thousands of Afghan fighters were sent in connection with the outbreak of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a result of these events, a “hybrid” of local organized crime and terrorism imported from Afghanistan was born in the Balkans. The region has become a focal point on a smuggling route for Taliban-produced drugs to enter Europe. Both forms of the phenomenon may threaten Poland’s internal security. It is evident that the term ‘narcoterrorism’ is a polysemic, ambiguous phenomenon, and such ambiguity would constitute a major obstacle for the legislator if he attempted to introduce this concept into the Polish legal language.

Keywords: narcoterrorism, drug trafficking, terrorism, drug cartel, organized crime, Columbia, Mexico, Balkans

O wieloznaczności pojęcia narkoterroryzmu

Abstrakt: Artykuł przedstawia zagadnienia związane z terminem „narkoterroryzm”. Wszedł on do użytku pod koniec zimnej wojny. Początkowo stosowano go w związku ze współpracą

handlarzy narkotyków z lewicowymi organizacjami terrorystycznymi w Ameryce Łacińskiej i państwami bloku sowieckiego. Należy wskazać, że nie istnieje w piśmiennictwie jedna, ogólnie przyjęta definicja tego terminu. Może on bowiem oznaczać zarówno stosowanie metod przypisywanych terrorystom przez kartele narkotykowe, jak i finansowanie działalności organizacji terrorystycznych z handlu narkotykami. W zakresie pierwszego znaczenia niniejsze opracowanie prezentuje przypadek Kolumbii i Meksyku, państw szczególnie dotkniętych działalnością karteli narkotykowych. W zakresie drugiego znaczenia przedmiotem opisu jest casus Afganistanu, w którym rządy terrorystycznego ugrupowania talibów finansowane są z handlu opium. Tak rozumiany narkoterroryzm uległ następnie swoistej „relokacji” na Bałkany, gdzie w związku z wybuchem wojny w Bośni i Hercegowinie trafiły tysiące afgańskich bojowników. Wskutek tych wydarzeń na Bałkanach zrodziła się „hybryda” lokalnej przestępczości zorganizowanej i importowanego z Afganistanu terroryzmu. Region stał się centralnym punktem na szlaku przetrzynu produkowanych przez talibów narkotyków do Europy. Obie postacie zjawiska stanowić mogą zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego Polski. Jednocześnie okoliczność, że termin „narkoterroryzm” jest zjawiskiem polisemicznym, niejednoznacznym, może stanowić poważną przeszkodę dla ustawodawcy, gdyby próbował wprowadzić to pojęcie do polskiego języka prawnego.

Słowa kluczowe: narkoterroryzm, przemysł narkotyków, terroryzm, kartel narkotykowy, przestępczość zorganizowana, Kolumbia, Meksyk, Bałkany

Introduction

The decades-long ‘war on drugs’ and the younger ‘war on terrorism’ have found a common denominator in the form of counteracting narcoterrorism. The term was introduced in 1983 by President of Peru Fernando Belaunde Terry to describe the alliance between drug smugglers and the Marxist Shining Path (*Sendero Luminoso*) group (Lee III, 1985, pp. 142–159). This alliance resulted in attacks by leftist terrorists on the state’s drug police. The word was then brought into public discourse by U.S. President Ronald Reagan as the U.S. administration saw the increasing influence of the USSR and Cuba over the governments of Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Chile, and Peru, and the latter’s ties to drug cartels (Chicos, 2015, p. 38). Thus, the threat of two kinds (criminal and political) was noticed in narcoterrorism which influenced the decision to implement against the entities involved in the practice, activities carried out by the U.S. intelligence services (Scott & Marshall, 1991). This type of activity carried out by Cuba and Nicaragua was considered an attempt to weaken the political and social structures of the democratic states of the Western Hemisphere (Oakley, 1986, pp. 86–100). At the same time, in the Cold War reality, the U.S. secret services learned that since the 1960s, communist Bulgaria – following the instructions of the Soviet KGB – carried out a barter operation with Middle Eastern terrorist groups in exchange for morphine and then distributed

it in Western Europe. This information was later disclosed during the trial of two employees of the Bulgarian embassy accused of helping Mehmet Ali Agca, who carried out the attack on Pope John Paul II in 1981 (Pilon, 1986, p. 84).

At the 1987 Congress of the American Society of International Law, it was recognized that legal measures alone could prove insufficient to combat the phenomenon of narcoterrorism. First, it was recognized that the cumulative scale of smuggling drugs and arms, and the terrorism poses such a threat to internal security and international order that the use of armed forces and the granting of jurisdiction to United States courts (even in criminal cases outside the territory of that country) should be considered (Blakesley, Penney, Nadelmann & Zagaris, 1987, p. 44). Thus, drug terrorism has become a powerful weapon in a propaganda war waged by governments against terrorists, insurgents, organized crime, drug dealers, and even other sovereign states (Wardlaw, 1988, p. 6).

Under the term narcoterrorism, two entities that for a long time were treated separately: drug trafficking and terrorism itself, as well. This concept was born from the understanding that they are interconnected and that coordinating anti-narcotics and anti-terrorism policies are necessary to combat both phenomena effectively. The existence of this link was known before, but the particular focus of the international community on terrorism after the events of September 11, 2001, has increased the attention also to narcoterrorism itself (Björnehed, 2004, p. 305).

The subject of the study is the phenomenon of narcoterrorism. These considerations have several purposes. These are primarily a presentation of the issues related to numerous, *pro maiori parte*, divergent definitions of the phenomenon in Polish and world literature. The polymorphism of the phenomenon of narcoterrorism will be revealed, and thus the ambiguity of this term, which may mean the use of terrorist methods by organized criminal groups involved in drug trafficking, as well as financing terrorist activities from drug trafficking. The first of the indicated meanings will refer to the situation in Colombia and Mexico, countries particularly affected by the activities of drug cartels. With regard to the second meaning, the article discusses the genesis of the relationship between terrorism and drug trafficking, as well as the phenomenon of the transfer of narcoterrorism, understood in this way to Europe, presenting in this respect the case of Afghanistan and the countries of the Balkan Peninsula dominated by Muslim populations. The potential effects of the phenomenon on Poland will also be discussed.

The purposes of the considerations outlined in this way allow us to put forward two research hypotheses. Firstly, there is no uniform definition of narcoterrorism. Secondly, this ambiguity of the term narcoterrorism would be an obstacle in transferring this meaning to the Polish legal language.

The article uses the descriptive method as a research method, analyzing and criticizing the literature. For the sake of clarity, it is necessary to define the concepts of organized crime, drug cartels, and terrorism at the outset.

First of all, it should be noted that in the literature on organized crime there is terminological chaos, which, according to O. Krajniak, is mainly caused by mythologization and the activities of criminal groups. These definition problems result from the prevailing myth of the Sicilian mafia being treated as a model of a criminal organization (Krajniak, 2011, p. 33). In the United States, the 1966 definition President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice is commonly used. It defines organized crime as a type of agreement with an extensive, multi-part structure based on an internal hierarchy, discipline, and 'rules of conduct,' which conducts planned 'business' activities aimed at mastering and monopolizing certain spheres of the economy (Mądrzejewski, 2008, p. 32). In turn, J. Brzezińska postulates that criminal organizations should be understood as broadly understood formalized associations with a hierarchical structure, division of tasks and organization under leadership, as well as informal agreements that share common ideas and interests (Brzezińska, 2008, p. 157). In Germany, the definition of organized crime was developed in 1973 as covering crimes committed by more than two-level links (unions) or by several groups cooperating with each other, not only temporarily, on the basis of a division of tasks. The current legal definition of organized crime in Germany (*Organisierte Kriminalität*) is the intentional, profit- or power-driven commission of crimes of high gravity, singly or collectively, on the basis of the division of tasks over an extended period of time or for an indefinite period, using professional or similar structures using violence or other means of intimidation, influencing politics, the media, public administration, the judiciary, and the economy, are considered jointly by at least two persons (Pływaczewski, 2008, p. 26). Under international law, the first normative definition of organized crime was contained in the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, which Poland ratified on October 2, 2021. Pursuant to the legal definition contained in Art. 2 (a): 'organised criminal group' means an organized group consisting of three or

more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert to commit one or more serious crimes or offenses established in accordance with the Convention, to obtain, directly or indirectly, financial or other material benefits. A serious crime within the meaning of Art. 2 (b) of the source of international law is conduct constituting a criminal offense punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least four years or a more severe penalty. However, in accordance with Art. 2 (c) 'Organized group' means a group that is not haphazardly formed for the immediate commission of a crime and that does not need to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity of membership, or a developed structure (United Nations Convention, 2000). Thus, an organized crime group has the structure of an organization, but it was not created accidentally and does not have to have continuity of participation, a developed hierarchy, and functions of its members. Secondly, the group exists for an indefinite period of time. And thirdly, its members act jointly and in concert, directly or indirectly committing crimes, and obtaining direct or indirect financial benefits (Łabuz & Fedewicz, 2021, p. 22).

With regard to the concept of a drug cartel, it should be clarified that the term 'cartel' itself comes from economic sciences and was introduced into the scientific discourse by Kleinwächter in 1883. The author defined a cartel (Kartell) as a remnant of a medieval craft guild, an agreement between producers of a specific industry concluded to eliminate competition and to regulate production in such a way as to adapt it to demand, in particular, to limit the production of surpluses (Kleinwächter, 1883, pp. 126–127). The term 'cartel' is not strictly defined in economic vocabulary, and various meanings are attributed to this word (Jankowiak, 1961, p. 245). Samuelson and Marks define a cartel as a group of companies that conspired to control prices and market volumes to provide members with a monopoly profit; reduce uncertainty related to the behavior of competitors; create additional entry barriers for new businesses. The aim of the cartel is to maximize the collective profit of its members by acting as a single monopoly that, when its products are in demand, maximizes its profits by limiting supply and increasing the price (Samuelson & Marks, 2009, p. 480). Karbowski, Kryśkiewicz, and Prokop indicate that a cartel is an agreement of at least two entrepreneurs in order to coordinate activities on the market or their impact on significant factors of competition by: fixing purchase or sale prices and other transaction conditions; breakdown by production or sales level; market and customer allocation; restrictions related to the import or export of goods;

anti-competitive activities directed against other economic entities. Cartels are specific associations of market participants to control sectors of the economy by regulating prices, demand, or supply for a given product. The form of such cooperation is strictly defined by the members of the cartel, the aim of which is to eliminate competition from the market. Thus, cartels function only in the free-market economy system and are aimed at gaining a dominant position in a given field of the economy (Karbowski, Kryśkiewicz & Prokop, 2018, p. 2). Special types of cartels are export cartels, covered by a horizontal restriction of competition, in the form of an agreement of enterprises of the same industry in order to limit or eliminate competition in the export of goods to foreign markets (Jacquemin, Nambu & Dewez, 1981, p. 685). Astorga and Shirk postulate that the term 'drug cartel' should be avoided in relation to the organized crime involved in the production and trafficking of drugs because, in economics, it is commonly used to refer to formal agreements between legal participants in economic transactions (Astorga & Shirk, 2010, p. 34). However, it seems that this postulate has not found recognition in the literature on the subject and is not accurate. The only difference between the legal activity of participants in cartel collusion in a market economy and the illegal trade in drugs by criminal groups is indisputable and, at the same time, obvious. Price collusion of cocaine producers and distributors, typical of market cartels, took place in the Andean countries as early as the 1980s, as did the competition and the creation of spheres of influence on sales markets (Ługowska, 2002, p. 44). It was as a result of the criminals' agreement on the price and distribution of drugs that the demand for cocaine in the United States increased by 175% (Menzel, 1996, p. 9). Bunker and Sullivan, studying the evolution of drug cartels, concluded that the formation of cartels allowed drug producers to achieve economies of scale that were unknown to individual cocaine entrepreneurs in the mid-1970s (Sullivan, 2012, p. 12; Bunker & Sullivan, 1998, p. 55–74). Following Jargiełło, it can be noted that a drug cartel is a type of organized crime. It consists in the permanent conduct by non-state entities of activities in the field of production, trade, and distribution of psychoactive substances prohibited by international or national law. Organizations that are its subjects have a fixed internal structure and are guided by the desire for material benefits, and in the implementation of their intentions, they use physical violence and some forms of unlawful pressure (Jargiełło, 2020, p. 290). The U.S. Department of Justice distinguishes between drug cartels and drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). The first are large, highly

sophisticated organizations composed of multiple DTOs and cells with specific tasks such as drug transportation, security/enforcement, or money laundering. The command-and-control structures of the drug cartel are located outside the United States. Production, transport, and distribution of illicit drugs in the country are carried out with the help of DTOs that are part of or allied with a cartel. DTOs are complex organizations with well-defined command and control structures that produce, transport and/or distribute large quantities of one or more illegal drugs (U.S. Department of Justice, 2010). A special feature of drug cartels is a formalized hierarchy with well-defined levels of authority and responsibility (Vigil, 2016). The Colombian Cali and Medellin cartels, which dominated the global cocaine market in the 1980s, had a vertical, pyramidal command structure. However, it was the hierarchical structure of these cartels that made it easier for the authorities to disintegrate them after eliminating their leaders (Dickenson, 2014, pp. 651–676; Phillips, 2015, pp. 324–336). Another common feature of such organizations is an efficient structure of oral and informal transmission of information and instructions, most often through messengers. In this respect, cartels operate similarly to terrorist cells. It is precisely the lack of established, enforced procedures that gives cartels a great deal of flexibility in responding to law enforcement initiatives or changes in drug markets. Drug cartels have shown great skill in adapting their criminal structures to expansion. In their structures, they promote specialization, which excludes many people from performing the same task or responsibility. At the same time, each cartel structure aims to protect the top management at all costs (Farfán-Méndez, 2019, pp. 294–296).

It seems that the biggest problem is building the very definition of terrorism. Schmid, in 1983, pointed out that there were at least 109 such definitions between 1936 and 1981. Neither has gained widespread international acceptance. The most common element in scientific definitions is violence (83.5%), political (65%), and fear (51%) (Schmid, 1983, pp. 76–77). As Gola noted, this dangerous phenomenon of the modern world is deeply rooted in social consciousness and most often understood as a subversive activity used only by rebels. Attacking innocent people is meant to create fear. Certainly, terrorism is the use of terrorist methods to achieve certain political, ideological, or religious goals. However, according to Gola, chaos is related to understanding this concept and believes that it is not worth trying to define this phenomenon. It is more valuable to identify features that effectively distinguish terrorism from various types of violence (Gola, 2001, p. 10).

Blackbourn noticed that a universal definition in academic, legal, and government is not possible. There are many topics that make it difficult to construct a generally accepted definition of terrorism. These are issues of power, legitimacy, and subjectivity. Modern assumptions about threats to national security underlie many government definitions. This is highly subjective (Blackbourn, 2011, p. 132). For this reason, many researchers believe that the term itself has no legal significance. Many groups have been classified as terrorist. It is difficult to clearly define how each group falls under the same classification of terrorist organizations. Terrorism itself is defined as an extremely wide range of activities of state and non-state actors (Salt, 2017, p. 168). Levitt, defining the phenomenon of terrorism in 1986, pointed out that the search for a legal definition of terrorism is somewhat like the search for the Holy Grail. Many have tried, and all have failed (Levitt, 1986, p. 97). However, the lack of a definition does not change the fact that terrorism has been a serious security problem for several years. For this reason, it requires both national and global countermeasures (Värk, 2009, p. 216). For the purpose of this article, comparing the available definitions, we define terrorism as a way of achieving predetermined intentions and making demands on third parties through the deliberate, systematic, unpredictable, and unexpected use of acts of violence or threats of violence against the norms of national and international law, against persons, groups, organizations, and state structures, using the aspect of fear and openness, regardless of accidental, impersonal victims.

After this presentation, which is necessary to define the concept of narcoterrorism, attention should first be drawn to the problems of definition.

Definition Difficulties. *Quot Homines Tot Sententiae*

The first attempt to define narcoterrorism in the literature comes from Boyce, who in 1987 described it as the involvement of terrorist organizations and insurgent groups in drug trafficking to survive and cover the costs of terrorist attacks (Boyce, 1987, p. 24). Thus, Boyce, *a priori* excluded organized crime groups dealing with drug trafficking outside the framework of the phenomenon. It may come as a surprise as it took place after a series of bomb attacks and attacks on public buildings carried out in 1984-1985 by the Colombian Medellin Cartel (Phillips, 2018, p. 53; Livingstone, 2004, p. 55). At the same time, this author emphasizes the instrumentalization of the drug business, which he treats as a tool for securing financing for a given organization.

Three years later (1990), Ehrenfeld described drug terrorism as the use of drug trafficking to achieve the goals of specific governments and terrorist organizations (Ehrenfeld, 1990, p. xiii). As it can be seen, the latter definition also subjectively excludes the activity of drug cartels from the scope of the phenomenon. It is interesting because it reveals the state as a potential actor (Ehrenfeld, 1988). However, Ehrenfeld did not take an extreme position and did not claim that the drug problem in the United States was only 'the product of a plot sponsored by the Soviet Union.' The author even noted that 'the available evidence suggests that the Soviets discovered the advantages of drugs *cum* terrorism relatively late' (Ehrenfeld, 1990, p. 10).

We are convinced that in terms of attempts to define the phenomenon, a special pivot was the collapse of the USSR and the collapse of the communist system of government. Disappeared the involvement of the authorities of this country and Cuba inspired and sponsored by them in attempts to influence the political situation in the Western Hemisphere, in Latin America. The subsequent later definitions focus – to a greater extent – on specific, typical 'pure' terrorism and forms of activity of organized crime groups than on the participation of state actors in the phenomenon under discussion.

Shafritz, Gibbons, and Scott coined the dichotomous term narcoterrorism in 1991. Firstly, it is to be 'a concept that tries to link international terrorism and international drug trafficking as parallel' industries 'that work synergistically', and secondly, it is 'the act of terrorism by drug lords and dealers to intimidate and neutralize drug legislation, and government and non-governmental drug campaigns' (Shafritz, Gibbons & Scott, 1991, p. 129). Focused on the activities of drug cartels is the description of the phenomenon, proposed in 2001 by Simon. Namely, he talks about a particular type of terrorism where the tactics are like that of traditional terrorism (threats, killings, bombings, kidnappings), but the motivations and the scale of resources are different. There are no ideological, nationalist, ethnoreligious, or separatist goals. Simon cites the 'pursuit of money and power' motivation that prompts the drug lords to attack anyone who tries to stop them. Since they are not fighting for political goals, they see no limits to the use of violence (Simon, 2001, pp. 331–332). Similarly, Napoleoni described the phenomenon in 2003 as the use of terrorist tactics by drug dealers and drug barons to protect their illegal activities and an alliance between drug barons and terrorist groups where both sides have a common interest in destabilizing governments

and destroying the established social order (Napoleoni, 2003, p. 229). On the other hand, Gus, in the same year, described narcoterrorism as political violence against drug dealers whose main purpose is to protect their criminal activities (Gus, 2010, p. 16). It seems that the above four definitions are incomplete because they ignore the aspect of independent drug trafficking activities carried out by terrorist groups to finance their activities.

In the United States, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is the legal protection authority that has been established to fight drugs. The DEA defines narcoterrorism as a subset of terrorism where terrorist groups, or associated individuals, participate directly or indirectly in the cultivation, manufacture, transportation, or distribution of controlled substances and the monies derived from these activities. Further, narcoterrorism may be characterized by the participation of groups or associated individuals in taxing, providing security, or otherwise aiding or abetting drug trafficking endeavors in an effort to further, or fund, terrorist activities (Hutchinson [U.S. Senate], 2002). The DEA definition focuses on terrorist groups noting that some of them use drug trafficking for income. According to the testimony of DEA Director of Intelligence S.W. Casteel, before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, 14 of the 36 organizations recognized as terrorists by the U.S. State Department profit from drug trafficking. This means that 39% of terrorist groups are active, to a varying degree, in the field of narcoterrorism (Casteel [U.S. Senate], 2003, p. 8).

Lee created a comparative definition in 2004 by showing the similarities and differences between drug cartels and terrorist organizations. As common features, he pointed to the secrecy of the planning and execution activities. This secrecy is ensured by the organizational structure divided into cells that guarantee operational security. This author shows a significant *differentiam specificam* (differential specific): while all terrorists are criminals, not all criminals (drug dealers) are terrorists. Criminals are driven only by profit, have no ideological motivation, and do not plan their own death in their activities as a suicide bomber does (Lee, 2004, p. 274).

Combs and Slann described (2007) the alliance between drug producers and the rebel group carrying out terrorist attacks as narcoterrorism. While the ultimate goals each group pursues tend to vary, the alliance offers them immediate benefits. Members of these alliances – coca growers, drug dealers, and terrorist groups – often share common goals. These include destabilizing the government,

creating discipline among growers, and freeing them from police and military interference. Reciprocal needs make pursuing these goals beneficial in some respects to everyone involved (Combs & Slann, 2007, p. 191).

Hartelius proposed a more complex description of the phenomenon as ‘part of the illegal complex of drugs, violence, and power, where drug trafficking and the illegal exercise of power have been aggregated in such a way that they threaten democracy and the rule of law’ (Hartelius, 2008, p. iii).

Indonesian authors, Prasetya and Syauquillah stated that narcoterrorism is ‘simply drug trafficking activity aimed at supporting terrorist activity.’ Profits from such activities are used to purchase jihadist weapons and for further robberies, particularly bank robberies. There is ‘symbiotic mutualism’ between drug trafficking and terrorist activities (Prasetya & Syauquillah, 2020). Of course, it keeps in mind that Indonesia is much more affected by jihadist terrorism than by the terrorist activities of drug cartels (Djuni, Prasojo, Saut & Tiara, 2022, pp. 21–32). Certainly, this circumstance influences the optics of researchers from this country and, at the same time, contributes to the claim that geopolitical conditions influence the perception of the phenomenon of narcoterrorism.

The most conciliatory definition of the discussed phenomenon was created by White and Chermak; they pointed out that the term drug terrorism refers to both the use of terrorist tactics by drug trafficking organizations and the financing of terrorist activities through drug trafficking. Terrorists engage in the production and trafficking of drugs on an international scale because this practice is their primary source of income. These authors emphasize that their position appears to be in line with the opinion of the U.S. government (White & Chermak, 2021, p. 83).

The Position of Polish Literature

In Polish literature, the term narcoterrorism has not been the subject of in-depth analysis. Chojnowski defined (2017) it as a type of terrorism involving the use of terrorist methods by criminal organizations in the fight against state institutions (Chojnowski, 2017, p. 175). This wording supplemented the earlier statement by Molendowski that narcoterrorists use acts of terror to disorganize and destabilize the state and to secretly take control of the economy and politics by corrupting state officials. The victims of the practice are people who may somehow constitute an obstacle to criminal activity – including members of competing cartels as well as people holding high official positions in the country. The attacks are also

directed against representatives of law enforcement agencies, police, soldiers, and journalists (Molendowski, 2000, pp. 229-230). The 2004 'Encyclopedia of Terrorism' defines the term as terrorist actions by drug cartels against the state to protect their interests (Zasieczna & Zasieczny, 2004, p. 743). Similarly (when the term was born in the 1980s), Czerny discussed 'describing a situation of terror introduced by armed drug gangs' in 2016 (Czerny, 2016, p. 278).

The term narcoterrorism is used in Polish literature without defining it, as if intuitively, in publications on the security *in abstracto* (Kardis & Pauliuchuk, 2018, p. 42) on Latin America (Wordliczek, 2014, pp. 34-61), on individual terrorist groups (Fijałkowski-Myszyński, Dynak & Dąbrowska, 2022, pp. 59-74), and those on the typology of terrorism. There it is defined as a new phenomenon alongside criminal terrorism (Fischer, 2013, p. 276; 2012, pp. 155-187), a subtype of non-political terrorism (Borkowski, 2006, p. 47), and as a new kind of terrorism alongside superterrorism and cyberterrorism (Przewoźnik, 2020, p. 6). Sznajder generally indicates that the development of events at the end of the twentieth century additionally deepened the terminological confusion around this phenomenon (Sznajder, 2009, p. 3); however, the author neither specifies what events are at stake, nor what the 'confusion' is all about. Neither does Mielnik define narcoterrorism, but he brings an interesting linguistic remark. In this case, the author points to the use of the term terrorism as 'a modifying attribute, that is, a term that clarifies the meaning of this term and is intended to locate a given phenomenon in a specific point of reference' (Mielnik, 2019, p. 14).

Often in publications devoted to the typology of terrorism, there is no relation to this issue at all (Gierszewski, 2012, pp. 59-80).

Alternatively, without using the term narcoterrorism, mention is made of the 'South American' subtype of organized crime (Antonów, 2015, p. 76), 'related to the interests of drug bosses' (Antonów, 2013, pp. 61-62) where drug cartels use terrorist tactics and means of expression to carry out common crimes (Białek, 2005, p. 157). It is quite common to say, 'terrorism is often related to drug trafficking' (Wałek, 2018, p. 119; Resztak, 2011, p. 531; 2012, p. 156) or even that it 'is closely related to the drug business' (Motyka & Marcinkowski, 2016, p. 121).

An interesting observation (2017) was made by Fiedler based on considerations of the impact of internal and external factors on the development of terrorism in Central Asia. He pointed out that this entire ethnically complex region is exposed to the influence of radical Islam, which may place various forms of terrorism

there: narcoterrorism, jihadism, ethnoterrorism, or Islamic terrorism. According to Fiedler 'these terms are often used interchangeably and overlap, for example, one of the sources of funding for jihadist groups, including ethno-separatist groups, is the illegal production and distribution of drugs' (Fiedler, 2017, p. 307).

Wysocka, in her publication (2018), recognized that at the end of the 20th century, there was already a 'the division of terrorism into branches, depending on what ideology was the guiding ideology for its perpetrators,' and based on this fragmentation she distinguished its types 'such as religious, political, ecoterrorism, narcoterrorism, criminal terrorism, economic terrorism or terrorism of one issue, e.g., anti-abortion terrorism' (Wysocka, 2018, p. 136). However, the indicated division does not seem correct. Within the meaning of the above definitions, it is impossible to attribute any ideological motivation to narcoterrorism because, in the case of drug traffickers, they only use tactics analogous to terrorists, and in the case of terrorists - they derive financial profits from drug trafficking. In the first case, the motivation is to ensure the uninterrupted operation of the criminal group, and in the second - only to cover the costs of actual activities of a truly ideological nature.

Polymorphism of Narcoterrorism

An extensive and exhaustive description of the phenomenon was proposed by Petrakis. He emphasized the fact that the involvement of terrorist organizations and criminal groups in drug trafficking has the quality of multiple forms, as there are three main variants of narcoterrorism. They include, first, terrorists who use drug trafficking to support their political aspirations. The second option is when countries support drug-related operations (and the exchange of drugs for arms) with the aim of creating political instability in other countries. The third is a case of drug dealers using terrorist tactics such as bombings, homicides, and kidnappings to increase their profits (Petrakis, 2001, pp. 119–120).

The second definition seems to be more precise. It is characterized, in contrast to the above-mentioned, by the value of completeness, without omitting any of its components. It also considers the perception of the still Cold War phenomenon in its dimension, relating to the participation of state actors. At the same time, it confirms the characteristics of narcoterrorism as a polymorphic phenomenon. An attempt to define it simply would result in imprecision, as it may have different goals and consequences depending on what part of the complex word is underlined.

This term can be used, in the first sense, to describe the use of terrorist methods used by drug cartels. In this case, terrorism is a means (method) ensuring the achievement of the goal of profits from drug trafficking and not the goal 'in itself' of the activity of an organized criminal group. Initially associated with the drug-producing regions of Central Asia (*Golden Crescent*) and Southeast Asia (*Golden Triangle*), it is now associated essentially exclusively with Latin America (Björnehed, 2004, p. 305).

However, in the second meaning, we are talking about financing their activities strictly terrorist groups from the profits obtained from the drug trade. The reverse is true here: 'terrorism is the goal of terrorism,' and income is the means of its implementation, ensuring the functioning of the group. An additional factor blurring the picture of the phenomenon is the cooperation between drug cartels operating on an international scale using terrorist methods and terrorist groups that deal in drugs. These circumstances require a broader analysis to ensure the correctness of the conceptual grid.

The definition of narcoterrorism can therefore be twofold, depending on the emphasis on the drug aspect or on terrorism. Al Asyari argues that even with this dichotomy in mind, narcoterrorism remains a problematic concept and complicates rather than facilitates discussions about the two concepts it embodies. The author claims that the very concept of terrorism loses a kind of 'weakening' diffusion because of its attachment to other concepts, such as cyberterrorism, not directly related to the use of violence or ecoterrorism (Al Asyari, 2022, pp. 1–23). Some authors, such as Dishman, avoid the use of the term narcoterrorism focusing only on the convergence between criminal and terrorist organizations, describing them as 'a leaderless nexus' (Dishman, 2005, pp. 237–252).

Narcoterrorism as the Terrorist Activity of Drug Cartels. Colombia and Mexico

The term 'narcoterrorism' is used to describe the terrorist methods of drug cartels, such as kidnappings, killings, and the use of 'car bombs' in Colombia, Peru, and Mexico (Gaffney, 2018, pp. 157–168). Cartel activity has been defined as drug dealers' attempts to influence state policy through systematic threats or the use of violence (Björnehed, 2004, p. 306).

The scale of threats posed by terrorism and cocaine trafficking in this country can be illustrated by the events in its capital, Bogota, where in 1984, drug

traffickers carried out a bomb attack near the U.S. embassy immediately after the government announced its intention to extradite criminals to the United States (Phillips, 2018, p. 53). In 1985, *guerillas* of the M-19 terrorist group seized the seat of the Supreme Court and burned the court's archives at the behest of drug cartels (Livingstone, 2004, p. 55). In 1989, the Medellin cartel used a 500 kg car bomb that was detonated outside the Colombian Department of Security building. As a result of the explosion, 63 people were killed, and 500 were injured. The most tragic of these attacks took place in 1989 on a passenger plane of the Avianca airline, which was to be flown by Colombian presidential candidate César Gaviria. As a result of this act of terror, 107 people were killed (Vargas Rodríguez, 2011, p. 6).

Duncan, Sosa, and Fortou conducted an in-depth study of the link between organized crime and terror in Colombia. They showed that in the country, three different types of entities - left-wing terrorists, paramilitary groups, and drug cartels - were involved in organized crime, mainly drug production and trafficking. The first two political goals were financed by drugs, and the cartels operated on a purely commercial basis. Terrorist measures were used by cartels to put pressure on the government to counter the extradition of cartel members to the United States or to block law enforcement activities (Duncan, Sosa & Fortou, 2022, pp. 412–432).

Mexico is a country particularly affected by terrorism from drug cartels where the cultivation and trafficking of drugs have been taking place since the 19th century in the province of Sinaloa (Fernández Velázquez, 2018, p. 98). The breakthrough came in the 1970s when the consumption of drugs in the United States increased sharply, and local producers began organizing smuggling and distribution networks in the United States. The crime rate in this decade has increased tenfold (Pansters & Smith, 2021, p. 93). The situation dramatically worsened in 2000 after the overthrow of the one-party system of government and the start of the democratization process. In an obvious and historically repeatable way, such a systemic change was associated with the liberalization and weakening of state control mechanisms. The country has become an arena for the unrestricted development of organized crime, which has resulted in an increase in violence from cartels fighting for domination and control over drug trafficking routes. In a situation of weakening the state and the helplessness and ineffectiveness of corrupt law enforcement agencies, criminal groups took over actual control over part of the territory (Malonardo Aranda, 2013, pp. 43–66).

It was after President Felipe Calderon came to power in 2006 that Mexican armed forces started to fight cartels. During his eight-year rule, the cartels' struggle against the military led to approximately 83,000 casualties on both sides of the conflict (Atuesta & Pérez-Dávila, 2018, p. 236). Drug terrorists launched their own demonstration of force, in which dozens of mutilated bodies were left behind in public places (Ramirez-Pimienta, 2013, pp. 302–334; Caballero, 2017, p. 3). These actions by both the government and the cartels led to the highest homicide rate in Mexico in 2019 since the publication of such statistics. This year, cartels killed 34,500 people, almost 100 a day, and the city of Tijuana, bordering the United States, was declared the most dangerous in the world (Beittel, 2022). The largest drug cartels using terrorist methods are *Sinaloa*, *Jalisco Nueva Generación*, *Santa Rosa Lima*, *Juarez*, *Gulf*, *Los Zetas*, *Los Caballeros Templarios*, and *Beltran-Leyva* (Lee, Renwick & Labrador, 2021).

The recognition of the activities of Mexican drug cartels as terrorists by the international community, scientists, politicians, and journalists was almost unanimous. The reasons were the scale of the violence, the number of victims, and the brutality of the measures used (Mele & Semple, 2019).

Moreover, cartels – especially Los Zetas – established cooperation with the Islamic terrorist organization Hezbollah (Levit, 2016, pp. 119–133). This cooperation was related to drug trafficking, money laundering, and smuggling of people to the United States (Noriega [U.S. House of Representatives], 2013). Drug trafficking in the United States and Canada is estimated to generate \$ 147 billion annually for criminal groups. Terrorist groups are constantly looking for funding sources for their intentions, and the proceeds from drug trafficking attract their attention (Braun [U.S. House of Representatives], 2012). As indicated by Europol in the EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report for 2022, a similar situation also occurs in Europe. Similarly, members of drug trafficking networks in the EU were found to be affiliated with jihadism. Profits represent a core element of the nexus between serious and organised crime and terrorism. Some terrorist groups based outside the EU have engaged in profitable criminal activities on EU territories, such as money laundering or drugs trafficking. Hezbollah, the organisation based in Lebanon, has been using the EU as a base for fundraising, recruitment, and criminal activities from which they obtain significant profits. The network of collaborators built by Hezbollah in the EU is suspected of managing the transportation and distribution of illegal drugs into the EU, dealing with firearms

trafficking, and running professional money laundering operations that include the provision of money laundering services for other criminal organizations (EUROPOL TE-SAT, 2022, p. 20).

It seems that in the meaning discussed in this section narcoterrorism understood as the use of terrorist methods by organized crime groups involved in the production and trafficking of drugs is inherently associated with Latin American countries. In no other region of the world, the victims of this phenomenon are counted in tens of thousands of people each year.

Narcoterrorism as Financing the Activities of Terrorist Groups Through Drug Trafficking. The Case of the Afghan-Balkan Route

There are four primaries, major sources of terrorist financing. These include criminal activity, government grants, donations from sponsors, and – to a minimum extent – legal business ventures (Freeman, 2011, pp. 461–475).

Funds received from states or sponsors, despite their obvious convenience, have a fundamental flaw in a terrorist organization. It is donor dependency and the imposition of goals and means with this addiction. While in the case of a terrorist group ‘established’ by the secret services of a given state, there is an obvious institutional dependence, the problem is greater in the case of a terrorist organization planning its ‘own’ activity. Criminal activity, in particular its most profitable part - drug trafficking - does not have these ‘flaws.’

Thony identifies the importance of criminal activity in the economy of terrorism as key, pointing to the fact that the greatest source of terrorists’ income is drug trafficking (Thony, 2005, p. 245). The activities of Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Hezbollah, and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party are largely financed by drug production (Clarke, 2016). Against this background, a thesis can be put forward about the full symbiotic cooperation of terrorists with organized crime groups, especially those of an ethnic nature such as Turkish or Albanian specializing in the smuggling of large amounts of drugs (Pomianowski & Maćkowiak, 2012, p. 71; Hutchinson & O’Malley, 2007, pp. 1095–1107).

The genesis of the phenomenon of financing terrorist operations from drug trafficking can be found in Afghanistan. In the 1980s, large-scale cultivation of opium poppy, a raw material to produce opium, was started to cover the costs of the mujahideen’s fight against the USSR (Kajetanowicz, 2012, p. 256; Kosowski, 2013). Within one decade of the Soviet invasion, Afghanistan became a world leader in

this field, and opium production in the mid-1990s was about 2,500 tons per year (Rashid, 2002, p. 197).

After their capture of Kabul in 1997, opium production increased to 2,800 tons. It is estimated that 96% of Afghan heroin comes from territories overrun by terrorist groups that have formalized the drug economy to increase their income. The proceeds from the sale of drugs were used to support military operations against both internal enemies and the intervening NATO forces. They also began distributing drugs from Afghanistan through Central Asia to Europe in cooperation with Russian criminal groups. It should be noted that despite nearly twenty years of presence of NATO forces in Afghanistan, the harvest of the opium poppy (the raw material to produce opium) increased cumulatively from approximately 10 thousand tons in 2002 to approximately 330 thousand tons in 2018 (Czerniejewska, 2008, pp. 19–20; Sunday, 2022, p. 117).

After the withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces from Afghanistan and the re-assumption of power by the Taliban in August 2021, the production and global distribution of opium in this country increased to such an extent that by 2022 U.S. opioid drug sales fell, and the price of heroin fell (Cheek, 2022). The European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) is an EU agency that examines foreign, security, and defense policy issues. According to data presented by the EUISS in April 2022, 85% of all global opium supplies come from Afghanistan, and a third of the country's localities are involved in the production of this drug (Dreikhausen & Gaub, 2022, p. 2). Profits from the sale of opium alone brought the Taliban approximately \$ 2.7 billion in 2020. Afghanistan's drug production has increased tenfold since 2018, and Europol has seen an increase in the amount of the drug in the European Union (UNDOC, 2021, p. 6; EMCDDA, 2019, p. 15).

Apart from Taliban drug production in Afghanistan, another actor joined them in the middle of the second decade of the 21st century: an Islamic State branch – the so-called „Khorasan Province” (ISIS Khorasan, ISIS-K). However, ISIS-K finances its activities primarily through drug trafficking (Legieć, 2021, pp. 1–2).

Already in 2004, UNDOC issued a report on the links between international terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime. One of the critical cases was identified by UNDOC as a case of heroin trafficking in Afghanistan and the use of smuggling routes through the southern fringes of the former USSR to the Balkans. Trading volume was estimated at \$ 30 billion. The main smuggling route into Europe of heroin, produced in Afghanistan by both the Taliban government and

other terrorist groups, passes through Iran, Turkey, and the Caucasus and then through the Western Balkans (United Nations, 2004). The Western Balkans is considered 'the gateway to Europe for organized crime,' which also poses a risk of potential terrorist activity in or emanating from the area. Busuncian estimates that the biggest threat in the region is the link between terrorism and organized crime which is not only a source of funding but also the basis for recruiting new people and material support. This symbiotic relationship between terrorist organizations and criminal groups involved in drug trafficking is mutually beneficial. It enables the exchange of drugs for weapons and the use of the same smuggling routes and human resources. Similarly, there are similar methods of transferring assets and money laundering (Busuncian, 2007, p. 91).

According to another UNDOC report from 2015, already devoted to the smuggling of opiates via the Balkan route, the value of the drugs transported through it is 28 billion dollars annually. Approximately 90% of the heroin produced in Afghanistan is shipped through the Balkans (UNDOC, 2015, p. 3). And according to the latest report of the EMCDDA, in 2019, a total of 7.9 tons of heroin were seized in the European Union, with a wholesale value of EUR 553 million and a retail value of EUR 1.1 billion. However, in Turkey alone, located on the 'Afghan-Balkan' drug route, more than 20 tons were confiscated that year (EMCDDA, 2021, pp. 30–31). According to the EUROPOL SOCTA report from 2021:

'the wholesale trafficking of heroin to the EU is believed to follow several established routes, including the Balkan routes from Turkey traversing the Balkan region as well as the South Caucasus route via Iran, Turkey, Georgia, and Ukraine. The Balkan routes remain the main entry routes for heroin trafficked to the EU. For the most part, heroin is trafficked along these routes in lorries hidden among legal freight and cover loads or in concealed compartments' (EUROPOL SOCTA, 2021, p. 51).

Organized crime generates a steady stream of funds for terrorist groups. This makes it imperative to include efforts to eliminate drug trafficking within the framework of the 'global fight against terrorism.' The Balkan example shows how difficult it is to distinguish between terrorist groups and organized crime groups because their tactics overlap. Taking the example of the areas of the Balkans dominated by Islam, one can even speak of the birth of a new 'hybrid.'

native, organized clan crime and terrorism ‘imported’ from Afghanistan (UNDOC, 2021).

This ‘hybrid’ was born during the bloody ethnic and religious civil war that broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992. About 5,000 Islamic volunteers from Afghanistan, as well as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Turkey, and Algeria, were sent to the conflict area. They included veterans fighting in Afghanistan, members of terrorist organizations (Al-Qaeda, Islamic Armed Group, Hezbollah, Hamas), as well as radicalized Muslims from Western countries. An important role in 1992 was played by Osama bin Laden himself, who delivered 130 tons of military equipment from Sudan to the former Yugoslavia under the guise of humanitarian aid (Hajdinjak, 2002, pp. 10–11). Thanks to external support, Arab and Afghan troops were established in Bosnia. In the occupied territories, Islamic troops tried to introduce strict religious and customary rules, forcing the inhabitants to live in accordance with Sharia law, e.g., women were ordered to wear the hijab (Gibas-Krzak, 2018, pp. 93–94). Following the end of the war by the Dayton Peace Agreement of November 21, 1995, between 2,000 and 6,000 jihadists remained in the region, converted by humanitarian organizations, the armed forces, and the police (Džamič, 2001, p. 247; Wejkszner, 2010, pp. 215–216).

In 2013, one of the leaders of al-Qaeda, Ajman Al Zawahiri, announced the adoption of the ‘Balkans 2020’ plan (Dukić, 2020, pp. 58–59). The aim of this plan was to build a center for Islamic terrorism in the Balkans: terrorist infrastructure, including centers for the expansion of terrorism in Western Europe, the construction of training centers, and the recruitment of fighters to ‘white jihad,’ i.e., people with European appearance and fair hair, who can easily blend in with European society to carry out a terrorist attack (Azinovic, 2009, p. 1; Wilk, 2016, p. 149). The plans were to be financed by donations from sponsors and drug trafficking (Gibas-Krzak, 2018, p. 235).

The Polysemy of the Term Narcoterrorism as an Obstacle to Its Introduction into the Polish Legal Language

Finalizing these general considerations on narcoterrorism and its polymorphism demonstrated above, we want to present the theoretical difficulties related to the potential introduction of this term into the Polish legal language.

Polysemy (ambiguity) occurs when one concept has several meanings (Zieliński, 2010, p. 149). This is what we deal with when we use the term

‘narcoterrorism’ in different contexts. For this reason, an attempt to place the phenomenon of ‘narcoterrorism’ within the normative framework may run into problems and perturbations.

For the proper application of the law, such a polysemy would require its resolution by means of teleological or systemic interpretation methods or possibly by rules of legal conclusions, such *a contrario*, *a foritori*, *per analogiam*, and rules of logical inference. After all, in legal language, there is a prohibition of homonymous interpretation, consisting in the implementation of the directive that the same names should not be given different meanings (Kotowski, 2015, pp. 115–116). This is because ambiguity is a phenomenon characteristic of natural, colloquial language (Gizbert-Studnicki, 1978, p. 43; Malinowski, 2006, p. 23). It occurs when a specific phrase cannot be understood unambiguously (Doczekalska, 2021, p. 75). Gizbert-Studnicki defines ambiguity as the antithesis of the situation when ‘the native language user assigns one linguistic content, and this linguistic content precisely determines the scope of this word, i.e., about any subject, the native language user can decide whether it belongs to the scope of this word’ expressions. Words that do not meet the above requirements are ambiguous (Gizbert-Studnicki, 1978, pp. 43–44). The discussed situation concerning the expression „narcoterrorism” would constitute an exceptional case in Polish legal language. Polysemy is a form of ambiguity practically absent in this language, and the practical lack of polysemic expressions is one of the features that distinguish the legal language from the language of modern Polish (Malinowski, 2020, pp. 44–46). Such semantic ambiguity, equated with polysemy, would be regarded as a defective operation of the legislator (Halasz, 2019, p. 41; Tobor, 2013, p. 157).

In the discussed matter, the jurisprudence of the courts would certainly play a special role. One should refer to the resolution of the Supreme Court of 5 May 1992 (Sąd Najwyższy, 1992), which contained a specific postulate of uniform application of the law based on a properly formed judiciary (Bobkier, 2021, p. 97).

It can be assumed with a high degree of certainty that in the situation of the ambiguous use of the term ‘narcoterrorism’ in different (and sometimes even in the same) legal acts, there would be no such uniformity *non solum* for law enforcement authorities, *sed etiam* for citizens. It should be borne in mind that in public perception, the uniformity of the legal system is a value that is more significant for non-lawyers than for lawyers.

Recalling the considerations (1920) of prominent Polish lawyers Makarewicz and Longchamps de Berier, concerning, of course, a matter other than narcoterrorism, the act is to provide clear and concise provisions. Careless codification creates contradictions and ambiguities even in minor matters, and the legislator should be expected that the institution for which the provision was issued should be unequivocally regulated, as inaccurate expression often results in unintended consequences by the legislator (Makarewicz & Longchamps de Berier, 1920, pp. 245–258).

These remarks can be made directly in relation to the matter under consideration. Certainly, if the legislator considered it advisable to introduce the term ‘narcoterrorism’ into the domestic (Polish) legal system, such action would have to be preceded by building a legal definition that would exclude the present state of polysemy (Bobkier, 2022b, p. 30).

Summary

Narcoterrorism, in both meanings discussed in this study, may pose a dangerous (problem) for Poland and the Polish legal system (Bobkier, 2022a, p. 45). Although the entire Central and Eastern Europe is described in the scientific literature as a ‘terrorism-free zone,’ this does not mean that there is no terrorist threat in the region. The pro-American and pro-Israeli policies of the governments of the Visegrad Group (V4) countries combined with the participation of their armed forces in several American interventions may pose a risk of radicalization among locals; moreover, few adherents of Islam (Mareš, 2011, pp. 233–253). Stempień expresses a similar opinion, describing the threat of attacks in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary as ‘definitely less important’ than in the United States or Western European countries (Stempień, 2020, pp. 198–213).

On the other hand, according to the 2015 UNDOC report, the so-called ‘Northern branch’ of the Balkan route of smuggling Afghan heroin to Western Europe passes through Poland (UNDOC, 2015, p. 20).

In addition, Poland found itself in the area of interest of South American drug cartels due to, as Pływaczewski points out, its central location, the rapid development of international contacts, and the liberal law on drug-related crime. At the same time, the role of our state as a country used to transfer drugs will gradually increase thanks to the sealing of the southern borders of the European Union (Pływaczewski, 2021, p. 395).

Groups like the drug cartels and the Taliban are able to use the profits to defeat the west in two ways - by obtaining weapons to advance their mission and ideology by killing and fear and also by destroying the moral fabric of western society by creating a drug epidemic through addiction. Greed for power and money is the ultimate goal of both ideological terrorist groups and profiteering narcoterrorists. Types of groups use the same tactics of violence and killing to accomplish their goals (Durbin, 2013, p. 17).

The article allows for positive verification of the research hypotheses.

In terms of the first topic, it should be recognized that there is no uniform definition of narcoterrorism. It is an ambiguous term that can refer to both the use of drug trafficking by terrorist groups to finance and support their political aspirations and drug dealers using terrorist tactics such as bombings, murders, and kidnappings in order to increase their income and influence state governments.

Such a multifaceted nature of the term narcoterrorism would be an obstacle if there was a need to introduce it to the Polish legal language. Introducing the phenomenon into the normative framework could encounter perturbations because, in the light of such large discrepancies within the definitions that use the same term in its different contexts, one can talk about the occurrence of the term 'narcoterrorism' in the so-called polysemy (ambiguity), occurring when one concept has several meanings. Since Poland is already dealing with both forms of this phenomenon, it seems that a broader debate on narcoterrorism would be necessary based on more complete attempts to define it in Polish literature, as well as (perhaps) considering whether it is required to introduce narcoterrorism as a term of Polish legal language.

References

- Al Asyari, H. (2022). The Evolution of Cyberterrorism: Perspectives and Progress from The European Union and Association of Southeast Asian Nation. *Jurnal Hukum Ius Quia Iustum*, 29(1), 1–23. <https://doi.org/10.20885/iustum.vol29.iss1.art1>
- Antonów, R. (2013). Handel ludźmi a bezpieczeństwo człowieka we współczesnym świecie. *Studia nad Autorytaryzmem i Totalitaryzmem*, 35(4), 61–79. Accessed: <https://repozytorium.uni.wroc.pl/dlibra/publication/117228/edition/108264/content> [12.05.2022].
- Antonów, R. (2015). Charakterystyka współczesnego terroryzmu. *Studia nad Autorytaryzmem i Totalitaryzmem*, 37(4), 73–79. Accessed: https://www.repozytorium.uni.wroc.pl/Content/107906/PDF/08_Antonow_R_Charakterystyka_wspolczesnego_terroryzmu.pdf [12.05.2022].

- Astorga, L., & Shirk, D.A. (2010). *Drug Trafficking Organizations and Counter-Drug Policy Strategies in the U.S.-Mexican Context*. Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies at the University of San Diego. Accessed: <https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8j647429> [06.06.2022].
- Atuesta, L.H., & Pérez-Dávila, Y.S. (2018). Fragmentation and Cooperation: The Evolution of Organized Crime in Mexico. *Trends in Organized Crime*, 21(3), 235–261. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-017-9301-z>
- Azinovic, V. (2009). *Challenges to International Security: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina* (HUMSEC. Integrating and Strengthening the European Research Areas. Second Annual Conference on Human Security 2009). Accessed: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/102350/7_Azinovic.pdf [09.05.2022].
- Beittel, J.S. (2022). Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations (CRS Report R41576, version 46 updated June 7, 2022). Congressional Service Research. Accessed: <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R41576.pdf> [25.05.2022].
- Białek, T. (2005). *Terroryzm: Manipulacja strachem*. Studio Emka.
- Björnehed, E. (2004). Narco-Terrorism: The Merger of the War on Drugs and the War on Terror. *Global Crime*, 6(3–4), 305–324. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17440570500273440>
- Blackbourn, J. (2011). The evolving definition of terrorism in UK law. *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, 3(2), 131–149. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2010.512149>
- Blakesley, C.L., Penney, B., Nadelmann, E., & Zagaris, B. (1987). Drugs and Small Arms: Can Law Stop the Traffic? *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of American Society of International Law*, 81, 44–59. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25658348>
- Bobkier, R. (2021). Niewłaściwa reprezentacja banku w dokumencie wystawionym w trybie art. 95 ust. 1 Prawa bankowego jako podstawa powództwa o uzgodnienie treści książki wieczystej z rzeczywistym stanem prawnym. *Monitor Prawa Bankowego*, (11), 90–97. Accessed: <https://www.monitorpb.pl/wydania/1431.pdf> [06.06.2022].
- Bobkier, R. (2022a). Polimorfizm narkoterroryzmu. Terrorystyczna działalność karteli narkotykowych czy finansowanie terroryzmu z handlu narkotykami. *Kultura Bezpieczeństwa*, (42), 18–57. <https://doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0015.9476>
- Bobkier, R. (2022b). Współczesny narkoterroryzm w Ameryce Łacińskiej. Casus Kolumbii i Meksyku. *Zeszyty Naukowe Collegium Witelona*, (2/43), 11–38. Accessed: https://dbc.wroc.pl/Content/118160/zn_CW_43_2022_01.pdf [10.05.2022].
- Borkowski, R. (2006). *Terroryzm ponowoczesny. Studium z antropologii polityki*. Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek.
- Boyce, D. (1987). Narco-Terrorism. *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, 56(11), 24–27. Accessed: <https://leb.fbi.gov/file-repository/archives/october-1987.pdf/view> [10.12.2022].
- Brzezińska, J. (2008). Grupa i związek przestępczy jako przejawy przestępczości zorganizowanej. *Studia Erasmiana Wratislaviensia. Acta Studentium*, (1), 156–175. Accessed: <https://www.bibliotekacyfrowa.pl/publication/22377> [17.05.2022].
- Bunker, R.J., & Sullivan, J.P. (1998). Cartel Evolution: Potentials and Consequences. *Transnational Organized Crime*, 4(2), 55–74. Accessed: https://www.academia.edu/3173100/Cartel_Evolution_Potentials_and_Consequences [06.06.2022].
- Busuncian, T. (2007). Terrorist Routes in South Eastern Europe. *Connections. The Quarterly Journal*, 6(1), 85–102. <http://doi.org/10.11610/Connections.06.1.07>

- Caballero, J.P. (2017). ¿Qué querían que hiciera? Inseguridad y delincuencia organizada en el gobierno de Felipe Calderon. *Foro International*, 57(3), 729–736. <https://doi.org/10.24201/fi.v52i3.2453>
- Cheek, Z.W. (2022, April 12). *The Impact of Afghan Opium Cultivation on the American Opioid Epidemic*. University of Nebraska. Accessed: <https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/resposterundergrad/4/> [10.05.2022].
- Chicos, O. (2015). The Concept of Narcoterrorism and Its Implications. *Law Annals Titu Maiorescu University*, 14, 38–50. Accessed: <https://heionline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/latitu2015&div=44&id=&page=> [09.05.2022].
- Chojnowski, L. (2017). The Origins and Waves of Terrorism. *Scientific Journal Bielsko-Biala School of Finance and Law*, (4), 167–178. <https://doi.org/10.19192/wsfip.sj4.2017.10>
- Clarke, C.P. (2016). Drugs & Thugs: Funding Terrorism through Narcotics Trafficking. *Journal of Strategic Security*, 9(3), 1–15. <http://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.9.3.1536>
- Combs, C.C., & Slann, M. (2007). *Encyclopedia of Terrorism*. Facts on File.
- Czerniejewska, M. (2008). Sytuacja w Afganistanie po obaleniu reżimu talibów. *Studia Bliskowschodnie*, (2), 4–26.
- Czerny, M. (2016). Region peryferyjny wobec procesów globalizacji – eksploatacja surowców i zjawisko rugowania rdzennych mieszkańców Choco z ich ziemi (w Kolumbii). *Studia z Geografii Politycznej i Historycznej*, 5, 273–288. <https://doi.org/10.18778/2300-0562.05.13>
- Dickenson, M. (2014). The impact of leadership removal on Mexican drug trafficking organizations. *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*, 30, 651–676. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-014-9218-5>
- Dishman, Ch. (2005). The Leaderless Nexus: When Crime and Terror Converge. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 28(3), 237–252. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100590928124>
- Djuni, T., Prasojo, P., Saut, H.H., & Tiara, P.A. (2022). Study on Policing Management for Terrorism Crimes in Indonesia of the decade 2000–2020. *Asia Pacific Journal of Business Economics and Technology*, 2(2), 21–32. Accessed: <http://apjbet.com/index.php/apjbet/article/view/39/24> [07.05.2022].
- Doczekalska, A. (2021). *Język prawny w tworzeniu i transpozycji prawa Unii Europejskiej. Procesy hybrydyzacji*. Wolters Kluwer.
- Dreikhausen, V.F., & Gaub, F. (2022). *Taliban in or out? Afghanistan in 2025* (Conflict Series, Brief 5). European Union Institute for Security Studies. <https://doi.org/10.2815/132229>
- Dukić, B. (2020). Politički islam (islamizam), terorizam i utjecaj islamskih zemalja u Bosni i Hercegovini. *National Security and the Future*, 21(1–2), 49–94. Accessed: <https://hrcak.srce.hr/248308> [10.05.2022].
- Duncan, G., Sosa, S., & Fortou, J.A. (2022). *Terrorism and Organized Crime in Colombia*. In L. Paoli, C. Fijnaut, & J. Wouters (Eds.), *The Nexus Between Organized Crime and Terrorism* (pp. 412–432). Monograph Book.
- Durbin, K.J. (2013). International Narco-Terrorism and Non-State Actors: The Drug Cartel Global Threat. *Global Security Studies*, 4(1), 16–30. Accessed: https://www.uniad.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Durbin_Narcotics1.pdf [10.05.2022].
- Džamic, D. (2001). *Psi rata na Balkanu. Strani plaćenici u ratnim sukobima na prostorima bivše Jugoslavije*. Target.
- Ehrenfeld, R. (1988). *Narco-terrorism and the Cuban Connection*. Cuban American National Foundation.
- Ehrenfeld, R. (1990). *Narcoterrorism*. Basic Books.
- Europejskie Centrum Monitorowania Narkotyków i Narkomanii [EMCDDA]. (2019). *Methamphetamine in Europe. EMCDDA-Europol threat assessment*. EMCDDA & EUROPOL. <https://doi.org/10.2810/960781>

- Europejskie Centrum Monitorowania Narkotyków i Narkomanii [EMCDDA]. (2021). *Europejski raport narkotykowy 2021. Tendencje i osiągnięcia*. EMCDDA. <https://doi.org/10.2810/824171>
- EUROPOL SOCTA. (2021). *EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment. A Corrupting Influence: The Infiltration and Undermining of Europe's Economy and Society by Organised Crime*. European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation. <https://doi.org/10.2813/346806>
- EUROPOL TE-SAT. (2022). *European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2022 (TE-SAT)*. European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation. <http://doi.org/10.2813/467703>
- Farfán-Méndez, C. (2019). The Structure of Drug Trafficking Organizations and Money Laundering Practices: A Risk Appetite Hypothesis. *Journal of Illicit Economies and Development*, 1(3), 294–311. <http://doi.org/10.31389/jied.1>
- Fernández Velázquez, J.A. (2018). *El narcotráfico en Los Altos de Sinaloa (1940-1970)*. Universidad Veracruzana.
- Fiedler, R. (2017). Wpływ czynników wewnętrznych i zewnętrznych na rozwój terroryzmu w Azji Centralnej. *Przegląd Strategiczny*, (10), 307–318. <https://doi.org/10.14746/ps.2017.1.17>
- Fijałkowski-Myszyński, M., Dynak, F., & Dąbrowska, E. (2022). Historia FARC: pomiędzy partyzantką a terroryzmem. *Securo. Badania nad terroryzmem*, (8–9), 59–74. Accessed: <https://wnpism.uw.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Securo-8-9-EBOOK.pdf> [07.05.2022].
- Fiszer, J.M. (2012). Terroryzm jako zagrożenie dla współczesnych stosunków międzynarodowych. *Mysł Ekonomiczna i Polityczna*, (3), 155–187. Accessed: https://mysl.lazarski.pl/fileadmin/user_upload/dokumenty/czasopisma/mysl-ekonomiczna-polityczna/2012/MEiP_3_7_2012_Fiszer.pdf [11.05.2022].
- Fiszer, J.M. (2013). *Terroryzm jako zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa euroatlantyckiego i nowego ładu międzynarodowego*. In J.M. Fiszer, & P. Olszewski (Eds.), *System euroatlantycki w wielobiegunowym ładzie międzynarodowym* (pp. 267–295). Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN i Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa.
- Freeman, M. (2011). The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 34(6), 461–475. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2011.571193>
- Gaffney, F. (2018). *Narcoterrorism in Colombia*. In J. Windle, J.F. Morrison, A. Winter, & A. Silke (Eds.), *Historical Perspectives on Organized Crime and Terrorism* (pp. 157–168). Routledge.
- Gibas-Krzak, D. (2018). Terroryzm na Bałkanach. Geneza – nurty – prognozy. *Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego*, 19(10), 87–106. Accessed: <http://www.abw.gov.pl/download/1/2544/PBW19-Gibas-Krzak-polskawersja.pdf> [08.05.2022].
- Gierszewski, J. (2012). Postrzeganie i podział terroryzmu na podstawie przeglądu definicji. *Acta Pomerania*, (4), 59–80. Accessed: http://www.pomeraniachojnice.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/rozne/Acta_nr4-tekst.pdf [15.05.2022].
- Gizbert-Studnicki, T. (1978). *Wieloznaczność leksykalna w interpretacji prawniczej*. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego.
- Gola, B. (2001). Dżuma XXI wieku? Oblicza terroryzmu. Rozmowa z dr hab. Barbarą Gola, profesorem Uniwersytetu Zielonogórskiego, prawnikiem i politologiem. *Uniwersytet Zielonogórski. Miesięcznik społeczności akademickiej*, (02), 10–12. Accessed: <http://miesiecznik.uz.zgora.pl/wydawnictwo/miesiecznik11-2001/B07.pdf> [10.05.2022].
- Gus, M. (2010). *Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues* (3rd ed.). Sage Publications.

- Hajdinjak, M. (2002). *Smuggling in Southeast Europe: The Yugoslav Wars and the Development of Regional Criminal Networks in the Balkans* (CSD Reports, 10). Center for the Study of Democracy. Accessed: http://pdc.ceu.hu/archive/00001572/01/Smuggling_in_SE_EU.pdf [15.05.2022].
- Halasz, A. (2019). *Definicje pojęć prawnych w ustawodawstwie dotyczącym podatków obrotowych* (Seria e-Monografie nr 150). Prace Naukowe Wydziału Prawa, Administracji i Ekonomii Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego. <https://doi.org/10.34616/23.19.147>
- Hartelius, J. (2008). *Narcoterrorism* (Policy Paper 3/2008). EastWest Institute and the Swedish Carnegie Institute. Accessed: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/90550/2008-02-20_Narcoterrorism.pdf [10.05.2022].
- Hutchinson, S., & O'Malley, P. (2007). A Crime-Terror Nexus? Thinking on Some of the Links between Terrorism and Criminality. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 30(12), 1095–1107. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100701670870>
- Jacquemin, A., Nambu, T., & Dewez, I. (1981). A Dynamic Analysis of Export Cartels: The Japanese Case. *The Economic Journal*, 91(363), 685–696. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2232832>
- Jankowiak, L. (1961). Kartele w kapitalistycznym handlu zagranicznym. *Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny*, 23(3), 245–257. Accessed: <http://hdl.handle.net/10593/19780> [17.06.2022].
- Jargiełło, A. (2020). Strategia „królewskiego kręglu” jako przykład zwalczania przestępczości narkotykowej w Meksyku. *Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria i Praktyka*, (4), 289–302. <https://doi.org/10.48269/2451-0718-btip-2020-4-016>
- Kajetanowicz, J. (2012). Skutki społeczno-polityczne interwencji ZSRR w Afganistanie. *Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Oficerskiej Wojsk Łądowych im. gen. T. Kościuszki*, 165(3), 249–262. <https://doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0002.3494>
- Karbowski, A., Kryskiewicz, L., & Prokop, J. (2018). Kartele jako przedmiot polityki gospodarczej. In M. Strojny (Ed.), *Wyzwania ekonomiczne dla Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej* (pp. 79–89). Oficyna Wydawnicza SGH.
- Kardis, K., & Pauliuchuk, Y. (2018). Zagrożenia mające wpływ na bezpieczeństwo społeczne państwa. *Współczesne Problemy Zarządzania*, 6(1/12), 33–48. <https://doi.org/10.52934/wpz.104>
- Kleinwächter, F. (1883). *Die Kartelle: Ein Beitrag zur Frage der Organisation der Volkswirtschaft*. Wagner.
- Kosowski, A. (2013). Interwencja ZSRR w Afganistanie. *Res Politicae*, 5(1), 83–102. Accessed: <http://dlibra.bg.ajd.czest.pl:8080/Content/2722/83.pdf> [08.05.2022].
- Kotowski, A. (2015). Z problematyki metody interpretacji językowo-logicznej – uwagi na gruncie dekodowania znaczenia prawnego-karnego. *Prokuratura i Prawo*, (6), 101–135. Accessed: <https://www.gov.pl/web/prokuratura-krajowa/numer-6-2015> [10.05.2022].
- Krajniak, O. (2011). *Zorganizowane grupy przestępcze: studium kryminalistyczne*. Wolters Kluwer.
- Lee, B., Renwick, D., & Labrador, R.C. (2021). *CFR Backgrounder: Mexico's Drug War* [updated September 7, 2022 by CFR.org Editors: *Mexico's Long War: Drugs, Crime, and the Cartels*]. Council of Foreign Relations. Accessed: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/mexicos-long-war-drugs-crime-and-cartels> [24.10.2022].
- Lee, G.D. (2004). *Global Drug Enforcement: Practical Investigative Techniques*. CRC Press.
- Lee III, R.W. (1985). The Latin American Drug Connection. *Foreign Policy*, (61), 142–159. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1148706>
- Legieć, A. (2021). Perspektywy rozwoju tzw. Państwa Islamskiego w Afganistanie. *Biuletyn Polskiego Instytutu Spraw Międzynarodowych*, (173). Accessed: <https://www.pism.pl/publikacje/perspektywy-rozwoju-tzw-panstwa-islamskiego-w%C2%A0afganistanie> [10.06.2022].

- Levitt, G. (1986). Is Terrorism Worth Defining? *Ohio Northern University Law Review*, 13, 97–110. Accessed: [https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/onulr13&div=15&id=&page=\[10.12.2022\]](https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/onulr13&div=15&id=&page=[10.12.2022]).
- Levitt, M. (2016). Iranian and Hezbollah Operations in South America. Then and Now. *PRISM – The Journal of Complex Operations*, 5(4), 119–133. Accessed: https://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_5-4/Iranian%20and%20Hezbollah.pdf [15.06.2022].
- Livingstone, G. (2004). *Inside Colombia. Drugs, Democracy and War*. Rutgers University Press.
- Łabuz, P., & Fedewicz, H. (2021). *Definiowanie przestępczości zorganizowanej – rozważania interpretacyjne*. In Aktualne problemy doskonalenia czynności kryminalistycznych i ścigania przestępstw (Zbiór materiałów z 1 międzynarodowej konferencji naukowej i praktycznej, Kropywnytskyi, 24.09.2021; pp. 21–24). Central Ukrainian Publishing House LLC. Accessed: https://ndekc-kirovograd.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Збірник_КНДЕКЦ_24.09.21.pdf#page=21 [15.06.2022].
- Ługowska, U. (2002). *Boom kokainowy w Ameryce Łacińskiej. Casus Boliwii*. Trio.
- Makarewicz, J., & Longchamps de Berier, R. (1920). Ustawa o szkołach akademickich: uwagi prof. Makarewicza i prof. Longchamps de Berier. *Przegląd Prawa i Administracji. Rozprawy i zapiski literackie*, 45(10–12), 245–258.
- Malinowski, A. (2006). *Redagowanie tekstu prawnego. Wybrane wskazania logiczno-językowe*. LexisNexis.
- Malinowski, A. (2020). *Błędy formalne w tekstach prawnych*. Wolters Kluwer.
- Malonardo Aranda, S. (2013). Stories of Drug Trafficking in Rural Mexico: Territories, Drugs and Cartels in Michoacán. *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, (94), 43–66. <http://doi.org/10.18352/erlacs.8393>
- Mareš, M. (2011). Terrorism-Free Zone in East Central Europe? Strategic Environment, Risk Tendencies, and Causes of Limited Terrorist Activities in the Visegrad Group. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 23(2), 233–253. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2010.529389>
- Mądrzejowski, W. (2008). *Przestępczość zorganizowana. System zwalczania*. Editions Spotkania.
- Mele, Ch., & Semple, K. (2019, December 6). Trump Says He Will Delay Terrorist Designation for Mexican Cartels. *The New York Times*. Accessed: <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/06/us/trump-drug-cartels-terrorists.html> [07.06.2022].
- Menzel, S.H. (1996). *Fire in the Andes. U.S. Foreign Policy and Cocaine Politics in Bolivia and Peru*. University Press of America.
- Mielnik, D. (2019). *Działalność bliskowschodnich organizacji terrorystycznych w kontekście bezpieczeństwa europejskiego: Wybrane problemy*. In T. Kośmider, & M. Strzelec (Eds.), *Rozważania nad problematyką bezpieczeństwa publicznego. Przeciwdziałanie zagrożeniom. Rola służb* (pp. 13–34). Wydawnictwo Instytutu Wymiaru Sprawiedliwości.
- Molendowski, W. (2000). *Narkoterroryzm*. In C. Mojsiewicz (Ed.), *Leksykon współczesnych międzynarodowych stosunków politycznych* (pp. 229–230). Atla2.
- Motyka, M., & Marcinkowski, J.T. (2016). Nowe metody odurzania się: Część XI. Captagon – narkotyki używane przez terrorystów. *Problemy Higieny i Epidemiologii*, 97(2), 118–124. Accessed: <http://www.phie.pl/pdf/phe-2016/phe-2016-2-118.pdf> [05.06.2022].
- Napoleoni, L. (2003). *Modern Jihad: Tracing the Dollars Behind the Terror Networks*. Pluto Press.
- Oakley, R.B. (1986). Combating Terrorism. *Harvard International Review*, (6), 86–100.

- Pansters, W.G., & Smith, B.T. (2021). La mafia muere: Violence, drug trade and the state in Sinaloa, 1940–1980. *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, (112), 91–116. <https://doi.org/10.32992/erlacs.10867>
- Petrakis, G.J. (2001). *Organized Crime and the Financing of Terrorist and Guerrilla Movements*. In A.P. Schmid (Ed.), *Countering Terrorism through International Cooperation* (pp. 119–120). International Scientific and Professional Advisory Council of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme (ISPAC).
- Phillips, B.J. (2015). How does leadership decapitation affect violence? The case of drug trafficking organizations in Mexico. *The Journal of Politics*, 77(2), 324–336. <https://doi.org/10.1086/680209>
- Phillips, B.J. (2018). Terrorist Tactics by Criminal Organizations: The Mexican Case in Context. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 12(1), 46–63. Accessed: <https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/customsites/perspectives-on-terrorism/2018/03-terrorist-tactics-by-criminal-organizations---the-mexican-case-in-context-by-brian-j.-phillips.pdf> [20.05.2022].
- Pilon, J.G. (1986). The Bulgarian Nexus. *The National Interest*, 3, 84–87. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/42894418>
- Pływaczewski, W. (2008). *Przestępczość zorganizowana*. Beck.
- Pływaczewski, W. (2021). Współczesne trendy przestępczości zorganizowanej w Europie (analiza wybranych zjawisk przestępczych z uwzględnieniem zadań Agencji Unii Europejskiej ds. Współpracy Organów Ścigania – Europol). *Studia Prawnoustrojowe*, (52), 387–410. <https://doi.org/10.31648/sp.6678>
- Pomianowski, P., & Maćkowiak, E. (2012). Zwalczenie finansowania terroryzmu w świetle prawa obowiązującego w Polsce i we Francji. *Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego*, 4(6), 71–93. Accessed: <http://www.abw.gov.pl/download/1/1829/Pomianowski.pdf> [20.05.2022].
- Prasetya, A.B., & Syaullillah, M. (2020). The Dynamics of Narcoterrorism in Indonesia. Case Study: Fadli Sadama. In M.S. Rofii, A.I. Munandar, & D.M. Yusof (Eds.), *Proceedings of 3rd International Conference on Strategic and Global Studies* (ICSGS 2019, 6-7 November 2019, Jakarta, Indonesia, pp. 180–190). European Alliance for Innovation. <https://doi.org/10.4108/eai.6-11-2019.2297305>
- Przeźwiński, K. (2020). Psychologiczny motyw w zakresie przyczyn oraz skutków terroryzmu. *Młoda Humanistyka*, 16(1). Accessed: <http://humanistyka.com/index.php/MH/article/view/271> [10.05.2022].
- Ramirez-Pimienta, J.C. (2013). De torturaciones, balas y explosiones. Narcocultura, movimiento e hiperrealismo en el extenio de Felipe Calderon. *A Contracorriente: Una Revista de Historia Social y Literatura de America Latina*, 10(3), 302–334. Accessed: <https://acontracorriente.chass.ncsu.edu/index.php/acontracorriente/article/view/570/1193> [20.05.2022].
- Rashid, A. (2002). *Talibowie: wojujący islam, ropa naftowa i fundamentalizm w Środkowej Azji*. Wydawnictwo Znak.
- Resztak, I. (2011). Pojęcie, historia i typologia zjawiska terroryzmu. *Naukovy Visnyk Lvivs'koho Derzhavnoho Universytetu Vnutrishnikh Sprav*, (4), 522–534. Accessed: https://www1.lvduvs.edu.ua/documents_pdf/library/visnyky/nvsvy/04_2011/11irtzt.pdf [20.05.2022].
- Resztak, I. (2012). Zjawisko terroryzmu. *Prokuratura i Prawo*, (7–8), 148–159. Accessed: <https://www.gov.pl/web/prokuratura-krajowa/numer-7-8-2012> [17.05.2022].
- Salt, A. (2017). Blurred Lines: Mexican Cartels and the Narco-Terrorism Debate. *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, 18(1), 166–188. Accessed: <https://jmss.org/article/view/58284/43840> [20.05.2022].
- Samuelson, W.F., & Marks, S.G. (2009). *Ekonomia menedżerska* (2nd ed.). Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne.

- Sąd Najwyższy. (1992). Uchwała pełnego składu Sądu Najwyższego z 5.05.1992 r. (KwPr 5/92). OSNKW 1993, nr 1–2, poz. 1.
- Schmid, A.P. (1983). *Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Databases, and Literature*. North Holland Publishing.
- Scott, P.D., & Marshall, J. (1991). *Cocaine Politics: Drugs, Armies and the CIA in Central America*. University of California Press.
- Shafritz, J.M., Gibbons, E.F., & Scott, G.E.J. (1991). *Almanac of Modern Terrorism*. Facts on File.
- Simon, J.D. (2001). *The Terrorist Trap: America's Experience with Terrorism* (2nd ed.). Indiana University Press.
- Stempień, M.S. (2020). How Limited Is the Terrorist Threat in the Visegrad Group Member States? Terrorist Activities in the V4 in the Light of the Global Terrorism Database and Its Social Impact. *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 33(2), 198–213. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2020.1756706>
- Sullivan, J.P. (2012). *From Drug Wars to Criminal Insurgency: Mexican Cartels, Criminal Enclaves and Criminal Insurgency in Mexico and Central America. Implications for Global Security* (Working Papers Series, 9). Fondation Maison des Sciences de l'Homme. Accessed: <https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00694083/document> [25.05.2022].
- Sunday, U.U. (2022). The Taliban and the Political Economy of International Terrorism in Afghanistan. *International Journal of Development and Public Policy*, 1(8), 110–127. Accessed: <https://openaccessjournals.eu/index.php/ijdpp/article/view/932> [20.05.2022].
- Sznajder, G. (2009). Terroryzm i fundamentalizm islamski. Piętno współczesnego świata? *Rocznik Ostrowskiego Towarzystwa Naukowego*, (3–4). Accessed: http://otnostrow.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/2009_14_Sznajder.pdf [15.05.2022].
- Thony, J.F. (2005). Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing: An Overview. In (n.d.), *Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law* (Vol. 3, pp. 241–264). International Monetary Fund. <https://doi.org/10.5089/9781589063341.072>
- Tobor, Z. (2013). *W poszukiwaniu intencji prawodawcy*. Wolters Kluwer.
- United Nations. (2004, October 1). *UN Warns About Nexus Between Drugs, Crime and Terrorism*. Meetings Coverage and Press Releases (SOC/CP/311). Accessed: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2004/soccp311.doc.htm> [06.06.2022].
- United Nations Convention. (2000). U.N. Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000 [Konwencja Narodów Zjednoczonych przeciwko międzynarodowej przestępczości zorganizowanej, przyjęta przez Zgromadzenie Ogólne Narodów Zjednoczonych dnia 15 listopada 2000 r.]. Dz. U. 2005, nr 18, poz. 158. <https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=wdu20050180158>
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNDOC]. (2015). *Drug Money: the illicit proceeds of opiates trafficked on the Balkan route* (UNDOC Research). Accessed: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/IFF_report_2015_final_web.pdf [15.05.2022].
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNDOC]. (2021). *Drug situation in Afghanistan 2021: Latest findings and emerging threats* (UNDOC Research Brief 2021, nr 11). Accessed: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_brief_Nov_2021.pdf [15.05.2022].
- U.S. Department of Justice. (2010). *National Drug Threat Assessment 2010*. National Drug Intelligence Center. Accessed: <https://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs38/38661/dtos.htm> [12.12.2022].

- U.S. House of Representatives [Braun, M.A.]. (2012, March 21). *Iran, Hezbollah, and the Threat to the Homeland*. Hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security (112th Congress, House Hearing 112–78, Compilation of Hearings on Islamist Radicalization – Volume III). Accessed: <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg76517/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg76517.pdf> [07.06.2022].
- U.S. House of Representatives [Noriega, R.]. (2013, March 20). *Hezbollah's Strategic Shift: A Global Terrorist Threat*. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. (113th Congress, House Hearing 113–6). Accessed: <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg80122/html/CHRG-113hhrg80122.htm> [06.06.2022].
- U.S. Senate [Casteel, S.W.]. (2003, May 20). *Narco-Terrorism: International Drug Trafficking and Terrorism. A Dangerous Mix*. Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary (108th Congress, Senat Hearing 108–173). Accessed: <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-108shrg90052/pdf/CHRG-108shrg90052.pdf> [15.05.2022].
- U.S. Senate [Hutchinson, A.]. (2002, March 13). *Narco-terror: the Worldwide Connection Between Drugs and Terrorism*. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information of the Committee on the Judiciary (107th Congress, Senat Hearing 107–885). Accessed: <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-107shrg85660/html/CHRG-107shrg85660.htm> [15.05.2022].
- Vargas Rodríguez, V.H. (2011). Noches de luna roja. *Agenda Cultural de la Universidad de Antioquia*, (177)6. Accessed: <https://revistas.udea.edu.co/index.php/almamater/article/view/9453> [06.06.2022].
- Värk, R. (2009). Terrorism as a Threat to Peace. *Juridica International*, 16, 216–223. Accessed: https://juridicainternational.eu/public/pdf/ji_2009_1_216.pdf [05.06.2022].
- Vigil, M. (2016, June 15). The Structure and Psychology of Drug Cartels. *The Cipher Brief*. Accessed: https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/the-structure-and-psychology-of-drug-cartels [13.12.2022].
- Walek, T. (2018). Concept, Origin and Classification of Terrorist Phenomena. *Securitologia*, (2), 107–119. <https://doi.org/10.4467/24497436SCU.18.018.11595>
- Wardlaw, G. (1988). Linkages Between the Illegal Drugs Traffic and Terrorism. *Journal of Conflict Studies*, 8(3), 5–26. Accessed: <https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/view/14808/15877> [25.06.2022].
- Wejksznar, A. (2010). *Ewolucja terroryzmu motywowanego ideologią religijną na przykładzie salafickiego ruchu globalnego dżihadu*. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu.
- White, J.R., & Chermak, S. (2021). *Terrorism and Homeland Security* (10th ed.). Cengage.
- Wilk, D. (2016). Fundamentalizm islamski na Bałkanach wobec rozwoju Państwa Islamskiego. *Studia Politologica Ucraino-Polona*, (6), 142–151. Accessed: <http://journals.uran.ua/spup/article/view/166068> [20.06.2022].
- Wordliczek, R. (2014). Polityka zagraniczna Stanów Zjednoczonych wobec Peru na przełomie XX i XXI wieku. *Ameryka Łacińska. Kwartalnik analityczno-informacyjny*, 22(3–4), 34–61. Accessed: <http://cejsh.icm.edu.pl/cejsh/element/bwmeta1.element.desklight-cfc6a668-23ec-40ba-a8ca-bc936b62ccce> [14.06.2022].
- Wysocka, M. (2018). Definicja mutacji i ewolucji terroryzmu islamskiego w XXI wieku. *Colloquium: Edukacja – Polityka – Historia*, 11(3), 129–140. Accessed: <https://colloquium.amw.gdynia.pl/index.php/colloquium/article/view/286/231> [15.06.2022].
- Zasieczna, B., & Zasieczny, A. (2004). *Encyklopedia terroryzmu*. Dom Wydawniczy Bellona.
- Zieliński, M. (2010). *Wykładnia prawa. Zasady, reguły, wskazówki*. LexisNexis.