Treść głównego artykułu

Abstrakt

Rozprzestrzenianie się broni atomowej stanowi jedno z kluczowych wyzwań współczesnego świata. Proliferacja jest także jednym z kluczowych problemów, z którym zderzyły się Stany Zjednoczone Ameryki. USA podejmują szczególne działania przeciw rozwojowi programów atomowych swoich przeciwników. W ciągu ostatniej dekady Waszyngton dążył do zahamowania północnokoreańskiego programu atomowego, jednak nie osiągnął pożądanego rezultatu: całkowitej denuklearyzacji Korei Północnej. Celem artykułu jest znalezienie przyczyn porażki Waszyngtonu, a mianowicie powodu, który sprawił, że negocjacje z Koreą Północną nie przyniosły zamierzonych skutków. W badaniach zastosowane zostały metoda historyczna oraz analiza treści, która została wykorzystana w odniesieniu do oficjalnych dokumentów, przemówień oraz oświadczeń prasowych. Okazały się one cennym źródłem informacji. Badania zostały przeprowadzone przez pryzmat realizmu ofensywnego i pozwalają potwierdzić, że brak zaufania między stronami, wynikający z anarchicznej struktury systemu międzynarodowego, uniemożliwił całkowitą denuklearyzację Korei Północnej. 

Słowa kluczowe

proliferacja broni atomowej dyplomacja atomowa Korea Północna Stany Zjednoczone Obama Trump

Szczegóły artykułu

Referencje

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