Treść głównego artykułu

Abstrakt

W związku z faktem, że wzrost potencjału Chin przyciągał w ostatnich dziesięcioleciach uwagę wielu badaczy, przywódca Chin Xi Jinping wyniósł to zagadnienie na nowy poziom, akcentując siłę militarną Pekinu. Doprowadził tym samym do postrzegania Chin w Waszyngtonie jako coraz większego zagrożenia. Zostało ono odzwierciedlone w Narodowej Strategii Bezpieczeństwa USA administracji Donalda Trumpa. Niniejszy artykuł analizuje podejście USA do najbardziej śmiercionośnego arsenału militarnego ChRL, tj. sił nuklearnych w szerszym kontekście amerykańskiej polityki powstrzymywania Chin w okresie prezydentury Donalda Trumpa (2017–2021). W artykule zastosowana została metoda śledzenia procesu (ang. process-tracing) oraz metoda analizy oficjalnych dokumentów, które zostały sporządzone przez Departament Obrony Stanów Zjednoczonych oraz Wspólnotę Wywiadów USA, wykorzystano także artykuły prasowe. W pierwszej części artykułu omówiona została rola broni atomowej w polityce międzynarodowej, a następnie zaprezentowana ewolucja chińskiej strategii nuklearnej. W drugiej części artykułu omówiona została polityka powstrzymywania Chin. Przeprowadzona analiza prowadzi do konkluzji, iż rozbudowa przez Chiny własnego arsenału atomowego, tj. głowic nukearnych i środków przenoszenia broni atomowej, stała się powodem wielkiego zaniepokojenia Stanów Zjednoczonych oraz przyczyniła się do postrzegania przez Waszyngton chińskiej broni nuklearnej jako rosnącego zagrożenia. Z perspektywy USA „atomowy smok” zyskał na sile w regionie Indo-Pacyfiku, zwiększyły się jego interesy oraz sprzeciw wobec dominacji USA w tym regionie. Co najważniejsze, stało się to niepostrzeżenie, w ramach  ukrytych planów rozwoju własnego arsenału nuklearnego.

Słowa kluczowe

Donald Trump Xi Jinping broń atomowa potęga Chiny Stany Zjednoczone triada nuklearna Donald Trump Xi Jinping nuclear weapons power China United States nuclear triad

Szczegóły artykułu

Jak cytować
Kharchuk, S. (2022). Stany Zjednoczone wobec chińskiej broni nuklearnej podczas prezydentury Donalda Trumpa. Rocznik Bezpieczeństwa Międzynarodowego, 16(2), 48–71. https://doi.org/10.34862/rbm.2022.2.3

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