Treść głównego artykułu

Abstrakt

Rozpoczęta w lutym 2022 r. rosyjska inwazja na Ukrainę stwarza istotne konsekwencje dla bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego. Wywiera ona wpływ również na państwa regionu Zatoki Perskiej, gdyż pośrednio i bezpośrednio oddziałuje na kwestie związane z ich bezpieczeństwem, rynkami energii oraz stabilnością gospodarczą. Arabia Saudyjska, Zjednoczone Emiraty Arabskie (ZEA) i Katar – mając zróżnicowane i częściowo sprzeczne interesy – zajmują niejednoznaczną postawę wobec konfliktu. Artykuł ma na celu analizę stanowiska tych trzech kluczowych aktorów państwowych z regionu Zatoki Perskiej wobec rosyjskiej inwazji na Ukrainę w pierwszym roku pełnowymiarowej wojny. W artykule argumentujemy, że stanowisko tych państw można analizować za pomocą teorii regionalnych kompleksów bezpieczeństwa (RSCT), bowiem ich reakcję najlepiej wyjaśnia właśnie perspektywa regionalna. Artykuł przedstawia kompleksowe wyjaśnienie polityki tych trzech monarchii wobec konfliktu w Ukrainie, wskazując na znaczenie dynamiki stosunków bezpieczeństwa w regionie Zatoki Perskiej.

Słowa kluczowe

rosyjska inwazja na Ukrainę teoria regionalnych kompleksów bezpieczeństwa Arabia Saudyjska Zjednoczone Emiraty Arabskie Katar Russia’s invasion of Ukraine RCST Saudi Arabia UAE Qatar

Szczegóły artykułu

Jak cytować
Kural, R., & Hryhorowicz, E. (2023). Stanowisko Arabii Saudyjskiej, Zjednoczonych Emiratów Arabskich i Kataru w sprawie inwazji Rosji na Ukrainę. Rocznik Bezpieczeństwa Międzynarodowego, 17(1), 15–32. https://doi.org/10.34862/rbm.2023.1.2

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