Treść głównego artykułu

Abstrakt

Opracowanie przedstawia problematykę zdolności liberalnych demokracji (głównie europejskich) do przeciwdziałania wrogim działaniom poniżej progu wojny w cyberprzestrzeni w warunkach policentryzacji ładu międzynarodowego, powrotu realizmu w stosunkach międzynarodowych (przy założeniu, że w przeszłości nastąpił jego odwrót) oraz przyspieszonej rywalizacji technologicznej między dominującymi graczami. Punkt wyjścia stanowią rozważania o utrzymującej się luce między „czasem operacyjnym” przeciwnika a „czasem politycznym” demokracji, widocznej zwłaszcza w atrybucji oraz w przekładaniu ustaleń technicznych nad decyzje polityczne. Autorka postawiła sobie za cel wyjaśnienie uwarunkowań tej luki i jej konsekwencji dla europejskiej odporności, a także zarysowanie perspektyw rozwoju zagrożeń w latach 2014–2025 (ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem okresu od rozpoczęcia agresji Rosji na Ukrainę, tj. od 2022 do 2025 roku). Poruszane w opracowaniu kwestie obejmują cztery obszary: kontekst systemowy i rosnącą rolę cyberprzestrzeni w policentrycznym układzie sił; instytucjonalne cechy demokracji liberalnej, generujące opóźnienia decyzyjne w kryzysach kinetyczno‑cyfrowych; spektrum i mechanizmy operacji poniżej progu wojny; skuteczność i ograniczenia odpowiedzi Unii Europejskiej (UE) i państw członkowskich na cyberzagrożenia. Do realizacji wskazanego celu autorka zastosowała głównie metody jakościowe, łącząc analizę porównawczą ram regulacyjnych i instytucjonalnych UE/państw członkowskich z analizą dokumentów strategicznych oraz studiów przypadków APT (Advanced Persistent Threat).

Słowa kluczowe

cyberbezpieczeństwo demokracja liberalna działania poniżej progu wojny dezinformacja infrastruktura krytyczna UE NATO policentryzm realizm cybersecurity liberal democracy sub-threshold operations disinformation critical infrastructure EU NATO polycentrism realism

Szczegóły artykułu

Jak cytować
Małecka, A. (2025). Ograniczenia reakcji liberalnych demokracji na działania poniżej progu wojny w cyberprzestrzeni . Rocznik Bezpieczeństwa Międzynarodowego, 19(2), 39–67. https://doi.org/10.34862/rbm.2025.2.3

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